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Abstract
Fixed term employment contracts have been introduced in number of European countries as
a way to provide ﬂexibility to economies with high employment protection levels. We introduce
these contracts into the equilibrium search model in Alvarez and Veracierto (1999), a version
of the Lucas and Prescott island model, adapted to have undirected search and variable labor
force participation. We model a contract of length J as a tax on separations of workers with
tenure higher than J. We show a version of the welfare theorems, and characterize the eﬃcient
allocations. This requires solving a control problem, whose solution is characterized by two
dimensional inaction sets. For J =1these contracts are equivalent to the case of ﬁring taxes,
and for large J they are equivalent to the laissez-faire case. In a calibrated version of the
model, we evaluate to what extent contract lengths similar to those observed in Europe, close
the gap between these two extremes.
11 Introduction
In this paper we construct a general equilibrium search model to analyze the eﬀects of ﬁxed term
employment contracts (or, for short, temporary contracts). This type of contracts were introduced
in economies with high employment protection levels in Europe and Latin America as a way of giving
ﬁrms some ﬂexibility in the process of hiring and ﬁring workers. Fixed term contracts stipulate a
period of time, typically between one and three years, during which workers can be dismissed at
very low or zero separation costs. If workers are retained beyond this period, standard separation
costs apply.
Since the introduction of ﬁxed term contracts during the eighties, the fraction of workers hired
under this modality has expanded steadily in Europe to reach more than 13 percent in 2000. There
are large cross-country diﬀerences behind this number, however, due to diﬀerences in the scope
and duration of the ﬁxed term contracts allowed for. For instance, some countries restrict these
contracts to certain occupations and type of workers while others given them broad applicability. In
this paper we focus on the case of Spain because in 1984 it substantially liberalized the applicability
of temporary contracts at a time when the country had one of the highest employment protection
levels in Europe (see, Cabrales and Hopenhayn 1997, and Heckman and Pages-Serra 2000). From
1984 to 1991 the fraction of workers with ﬁxed term contracts in Spain went from 11 to more than
30 percent and almost all the hiring in the economy became under this form (see Hopenhayn and
Garcia-Fontes, 1996). These reforms were partly undone during the nineties, when the maximum
length of the ﬁxed term contracts was reduced from 3 years to one year and the severance payments
for ordinary indeﬁnite-length contracts were substantially reduced. However, even after this partial
reversal, the fraction of workers under ﬁxed term contracts stabilized at about 33 percent.
Figure 1, which is taken from Hopenhayn and Cabrales (1997), displays estimates for the one-
quarter transition probabilities from employment to unemployment during the six years before
and after the 1984 reform, as a function of the length of the employment spells. The ﬁring rates
increased signiﬁc a n t l ya f t e rt h er e f o r ma n das p i k ef o r m e da ta ne m p l o y m e n td u r a t i o no f3y e a r s
which, not surprisingly, corresponds to the maximum ﬁxed term contract length allowed by the
reform. Thus, the introduction of the ﬁxed term contracts appears to have signiﬁcant eﬀects on
worker reallocation. In fact, there is considerable agreement in the literature that the main eﬀects
of introducing ﬁxed term contracts are a substantial increase in the ﬂows from unemployment to
employment (i.e. a decrease in the average duration of unemployment) and a signiﬁcant increase in







FIGURE 1: Fring Rates in Spain
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the ﬂows from employment to unemployment (i.e. an increase in the ﬁring rate) as can be seen, for
example, in the literature survey by Dolado et al (2001). The net eﬀect of these two opposing forces
on the unemployment rate is not as clear, but the evidence seems to indicate a small increase.
In order to analyze ﬁxed term employment contracts we introduce them into the equilibrium
search model of Alvarez and Veracierto (1999), which is a version of the Lucas and Prescott island
search model with undirected search and variable labor force participation. Similarly to Lucas
and Prescott (1974), production takes place in a large number of locations (or islands) that use
identical neoclassical decreasing returns to scale technologies. There are many ﬁr m si ne a c hi s l a n d ,
all of them subject to the same island-speciﬁc productivity shock. Changes in the island-speciﬁc
productivity shocks give raise to changes in labor demand across locations. Moving a worker across
locations is costly: It requires one period during which the agent does not enjoy leisure nor works.
In addition, agents that search arrive randomly to all the islands in the economy (i.e. search is
3undirected). When a worker leaves an island, he can choose either to work at home (stay out of the
labor force) or to search (become unemployed). Within each island, ﬁrms and workers participate
in competitive labor markets. We assume that agents have access to perfect insurance markets,
so that ﬁrms maximize expected discounted proﬁts and households maximize expected discounted
wages.
The employment protection system that we analyze is characterized by two parameters: the
ﬁring tax τ and the length of the ﬁxed term contracts J. In particular, ﬁrms must pay a ﬁring tax
τ p e ru n i tr e d u c t i o ni nt h ee m p l o y m e n to fp e r m a n e n tw o r k e r s( t h o s et h a th a v eat e n u r el e v e le q u a l
to or greater than J)b u ta r ee x e m p tf r o mp a y i n gﬁring taxes on temporary workers (those with a
tenure level less than J). Because ﬁring taxes are tenure dependent, the state of an island is not only
described by the idiosyncratic productivity level but by the distribution of workers across tenure
levels. Since workers are diﬀerentiated by their tenure levels, they participate in diﬀerent labor
markets and receive diﬀerent wages. Given that the ﬁrms and workers problems are dynamic, they
must take into account the equilibrium law of motion of wages across tenure levels. The presence of
the tenure dependent ﬁring cost implies that ﬁr m sm u s ts o l v eam o d i ﬁed sS optimization problem.
In turn, workers at each tenure level must solve a search problem, deciding whether to stay in the
island where they are currently located or to become non-employed. A stationary equilibrium for
this economy requires solving the process for the island-level equilibrium wages, so that the demand
for labor equals its supply at each tenure level and island-wide state. The economy-wide equilibrium
is described by an invariant distribution across islands states. This economy-wide distribution is
needed to describe the beneﬁt of search and the aggregate demand for labor.
If the separation cost are considered a technological feature of the environment, a version of the
ﬁrst and second welfare theorems hold for our recursive competitive equilibrium (RCE). If instead,
the separation cost are taxes rebated lump-sum, the most interesting case to consider, the welfare
theorems do not apply but we can still use a modiﬁed version of the planning problem to characterize
a RCE. In particular, we can break the economy-wide planning problem into a series of island-wide
planning problems, one for each island. Each of these island-wide social planners solves a similar
problem: To maximize the expected discounted value of output by deciding how many workers to
keep and how many to take out of the island. In this problem the island-wide planner takes as
given the constant ﬂow U of searches that arrive to the island. This ﬂow is independent of the
characteristics of the island because of the assumption of undirected search. The island’s planner
also takes as given the shadow value of returning a worker to non-employment. This shadow value
4is tenure dependent, to take into account the separation taxes τ. While the state of this problem
is the distribution of workers by tenure levels, a J dimensional object, we show how to reduce it
to a two dimensional object: the number of temporary and permanent workers. We also show that
the solution to this control problem is characterized by two-dimensional sets of inaction, one set for
each value of the idiosyncratic productivity shock. Given the solution to the island-wide planning
problem, the economy-wide equilibrium is obtained by solving for two unknowns: the equilibrium
shadow value of workers and the equilibrium number of searchers U.
We take the case with no ﬁxed term contracts and large ﬁring costs as our benchmark and
calibrate it to reproduce a stylized version of the Spanish economy before the 1984 reform. We
use this calibrated version to evaluate to what extent ﬁxed term contracts of diﬀerent lengths
add ﬂexibility to the labor market. For large values of J, ﬁxed term contracts are equivalent to
the laissez-faire case, since for large J most workers will be temporary, and hence if they were
dismissed they will be zero separation costs. Thus, we phrase the question of the added ﬂexibility
by computing how much of the gap between the ﬁring tax and the laissez-faire cases is closed when
ﬁxed term contracts of empirically reasonable length are introduced. We ﬁnd that even when the
ﬁring tax τ is small, introducing temporary contracts of a short length J sharply increases the
average ﬁring rate and decreases the average duration of unemployment. Nevertheless, for ﬁring
taxes of about a year of average wages (the value that we argue corresponds to Spain during the
eighties) unemployment rate, productivity and welfare change smoothly with J. For instance, the
unemployment rate is 2.4 percent points higher in laissez-faire than in the benchmark case of ﬁring
taxes (and no temporary contracts). With temporary contracts of three years duration, the length
of contracts after the 1984 reform in Spain, we ﬁnd that the unemployment rate is 1.25 percentage
points higher than in the benchmark case. We also ﬁnd that the welfare cost of ﬁring taxes is about
2.5 percentage points in the benchmark case (in perpetual consumption equivalent units), while the
welfare cost of temporary contracts of three years of length is about 1 percent. Thus temporary
contracts of 3 years provide substantial ﬂexibility, closing more than half of the gap between the
benchmark and laissez-faire cases.
Several papers have analyzed the eﬀect of temporary contracts, including a theoretical analysis
of them, such as Blanchard and Landier (2001) and Nagypal (2002). The models that are more
similar in spirit to our paper, however, are Bentolila and Saint Paul (1992), Hopenhayn and Cabrales
(1993), Aguiregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2004) and Alonso-Borrego et al (2005), since they all
study labor demand models with dynamic adjustment costs. One diﬀerence with the models in
5Bentolila and Saint Paul (1992), Hopenhayn and Cabrales (1993), Aguiregabiria and Alonso-Borrego
(2004) is that these papers consider partial equilibrium models (with exogenous wages) and do not
consider unemployment. The paper that is closest to ours is Alonso-Borrego et al (2005) since
it performs a general equilibrium analysis in a model with search frictions. However, there are
important diﬀerences. First, agents are subject to exogenous borrowing limits. Second, employment
contracts are constrained to have a constant wage rate as long as the employment relation lasts.
Third, workers under temporary contracts are assumed to be less productive than under ordinary
contracts, regardless of their actual or expected tenure. Fourth, ﬁxed term contracts con only last
one model period. Some of these assumptions, such as lack of insurance, are meant to provide
realism. However, they substantially complicate the interpretation of the results. For example,
it is unclear to what extent the results depend on the rigid wage contracts.1 We think that by
performing the analysis in an economy with eﬃcient contracts, this paper not only provides easily
interpretable results but provides a useful benchmark for evaluating deviations from the complete
contracts case. Other assumptions, such as one period contracts, are introduced for tractability.
However, the restriction to one period temporary contracts may be important, given that the actual
length goes up to 3 years. As a consequence, we think that the two papers should be considered
complementary.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economy. Section 3 deﬁnes eﬃcient al-
locations. Section 4 characterizes eﬃcient stationary allocations. Section 5 deﬁnes and characterizes
a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium. Section 6 gives a more realistic, although more com-
plicated, deﬁnition of a competitive equilibrium and establishes that it is equivalent to the more
tractable speciﬁcation of Section 5. Finally, Section 7 performs the computational experiments.
Seven appendices provide all the proofs and supporting material to the paper.
2 Description of the Economy
Production takes place in a continuum (measure one) of diﬀerent locations, or “islands”. In each
island consumption goods are produced according to F (E,z), a neoclassical production function,
where E is employment and z a productivity shock that takes values in the set Z. The process
1The analysis in Alvarez-Veracierto (2002), on which Alonso and Borrego’s paper is based, indicates that the rigid
wage contracts probably play a critical role in the results.
6for z is Markov with transition function Q(zt+1|zt), and realizations are i.i.d. across islands. We
let f (E,z) ≡ ∂F (E,z)/∂E and assume that f is continuous and strictly decreasing in E, strictly




where z ≡ min{z : z ∈ Z}.
There is a continuum of agents with mass equal to N. Agents participate in one of the following
three activities: to work in an island, to perform home production (or, equivalently, to enjoy
leisure), or to search. Non-employed agents, which we sometimes refer to as “agents being at a
central location”, either work at home (enjoy leisure) or search. If they work at home during the
current period, they start the following period as non-employed. If a non-employed agent searches
in the current period, she does not produce during the current period but arrives randomly to an
island at the beginning of the next period. We assume that search is undirected, so the probability
of arriving to an island of any given type is given by the fraction of islands of that type in the
economy. An agent that is located at an island at the beginning of the period can decide whether
to stay in the island or to become non-employed. If she stays, she works and starts the following
period in the same location.
We let Lt the number of agents engaged in home production at time t,a n dUt the fraction
e n g a g e di ns e a r c ha tt i m et. The period utility function for the household consuming c units of





As it is well known, the linearity of leisure in household preferences can represent an economy with
indivisible labor and employment lotteries, as in Rogerson (1988). To simplify the description of the
planner’s problem we will focus in the case where consumption and leisure are perfect substitutes,
which is obtained setting γ =0 . In this case we consider home production as an alternative activity






As we explain in Section 7, this assumption is without loss of generality, in the sense that there is
a simple mapping between stationary allocations with diﬀerent values of γ.
Up to here the environment is a modiﬁcation of the equilibrium search model of Lucas and
Prescott (1974) that introduces household production and undirected search, as in Alvarez and
7Veracierto (1999). We now introduce a tenure-dependent separation cost. In this section we introduce
this separation cost as a technological feature of the environment. In Section 5 we show how to use
the eﬃcient allocation of this economy to construct an equilibrium where the separation cost is a
tax levied to ﬁrms and rebated to households in a lump-sum way.
The tenure-dependent separation cost works as follows: if an agent has worked for J or more
periods in a location, then at the time that she returns to the central location τ consumption
goods are lost from production in the island. If she returns to the central location after less than
J periods, no separation cost is incurred. In Section 5 and 6 we present equilibrium concepts
that show that this tenure-dependent separation cost at the island’s level captures the temporary
employment contracts used in the real world.
3E ﬃcient Allocations: Formal Deﬁnition
Since the separation cost depends on tenure levels, an allocation must include the distribution of
workers by tenure in each island. We refer to workers with tenure j =1 ,...,J− 1 in a location as
temporary workers, and to those with tenure j ≥ J as permanent workers. Thus the state of a
location is given by its productivity shock z and by a J dimensional vector T indicating the number
of workers with diﬀerent tenures. In the sequential notation locations are indexed with their state
at time t =0 , denoted by X = T0.W eu s ezt =( zt,z t−1,...,z0) for the history of shocks of length
t, and index each location at time t by (zt,X), its history of shocks and its initial state. The initial
state of the economy is described by a distribution of locations across pairs (z0,X) and by U−1,t h e
number of agents that searched during t = −1.W e l e t η(X|z0) be the fraction of locations with
state X conditional on z0,a n dq0 (z) the initial distribution of z0. We assume that q0 equals the
unique invariant distribution associated with the transition Q. We denote by qt (zt) the fraction of











We indicate employment of agents with tenure j at a location (zt,X ) by Ejt(zt,X),f o rj =
0,...,J, zt ∈ Zt and t ≥ 0. Likewise, we denote by Sjt(zt,X) the separations, i.e. the number of
agents with tenure j that return to the central location.
Formally we say that {Ejt,S jt,U t,H t},g i v e nη and U−1, is a feasible allocation if the following


































































Ut,H t ≥ 0 for all t =0 ,1,...and iii) the initial conditions given by
Ej−1,−1 = Xj for j =1 ,2,...,J − 1,
EJ−1,−1 + EJ,−1 = XJ,
where E0,−1 = U−1,a r eg i v e n .
The ﬁr s tc o n s t r a i n ts t a t e st h a tt h en u m b e ro fe m p l o y e dw o r k e r so ft e n u r ej ≤ J −1 is given by
the number of workers of tenure j −1 that were employed in the island during the previous period,
minus the number of these workers that are taken out of the island during the current period. The
second constraint is analogous to the ﬁrst constraint for workers of tenure J or higher. It diﬀers
from the ﬁr s to n eb e c a u s ew ed o n ’ tk e e pt r a c ko fw o r k e r so ft e n u r ej ≥ J separately (they are
all lumped together into tenure J). The third constraint says that the employment of tenure zero
w o r k e r si sg i v e nb yt h o s et h a tj u s ta r r i v e dt ot h ei s l a n d ,m i n u st h en u m b e ro ft h e mt h a ta r et a k e n
out of the island. The fourth constraint states that sum of total unemployment, total employment
and agents out of the labor force equals the population N. The ﬁfth equation deﬁnes Ej−1,−1 in
terms of the initial conditions Xj.
Hereon we deﬁne Tj,t (zt,X) as the number of workers of tenure j available at the beginning of












































With these objects at hand we can deﬁne a planning problem whose solutions characterize the set














































for all feasible allocations given the initial conditions η and U−1. A feasible allocation {Ejt,S jt,T j,t,U t,L t} given
the initial conditions η,U−1 is stationary if Ut,L t and the cross sectional distribution ηt are con-

































for all zt ∈ Zt, X ∈ supp(η),a n dB o r e lm e a s u r a b l eA ⊂ RJ
+. Finally, we say that {L,U,η} is a
stationary eﬃcient allocation if there is some eﬃcient allocation
n
ˆ Ejt, ˆ Sjt, ˆ Tj,t, ˆ Ut, ˆ Lt
o
with initial
condition ˆ U−1, ˆ η which is stationary and for which
ˆ U−1 = ˆ Ut = U, ˆ Lt = L, and ˆ ηt = η
for all t ≥ 0.
4 Characterization of eﬃcient stationary allocations.
We refer to eﬃcient allocations being interior, as those in which are agents engaged in all three
activities: search, home production, and work. Our characterization of interior eﬃcient stationary
allocations consists on the solution of two equations in two unknowns: (U,θ), where U is the
unemployment and θ is the shadow value of being non-employed. One equation states that the
10shadow value of search equals the expected value of arriving next period to an island randomly,
according to the invariant distribution. The second equation ensures that agents are indiﬀerent
between doing search or home production. The ﬁrst equation is quite complex, it involves solving a
dynamic programing problem and using the invariant distribution generated by its optimal policies.
We refer to this dynamic programing problem as the island planning problem.
The state of this problem is given by (T,z), where T is a vector describing the number of
workers across tenure levels j =1 ,2,...,J at the beginning of the period, and where z is the current
productivity shock. The island planner receives U workers with tenure j =0every period. The
planner decides how many workers to employ at each tenure level, and returns workers to the central
location at a shadow value given by θ. The planner incurs a cost τ p e rw o r k e rw i t ht e n u r eJ that


























subject to 0 ≤ Ej ≤ Tj for j =1 ,..,J and 0 ≤ E0 ≤ U. We let G(T,z;U,θ) be the optimal
employment decision and T0 = A(T,z) the implied transition function with T0
j+1 = Gj (T,z) for
j =0 ,...,J − 2 and T0
J = GJ (T,z)+GJ−1 (T,z).
It is intuitive to see that if U is the economy-wide eﬃcient unemployment level, and θ is the
economy-wide shadow value of non-employment, the employment decisions of the island planners’
problem recovers the economy-wide eﬃcient employment decisions. To see why, notice that each
island faces the same value for U, since search is undirected, and the same value of θ, since workers
are identical once they leave the island and arrive to the central location.
As stated above, the shadow value of non-employment equals the discounted expected value of
arriving at an island with zero tenure under the invariant distribution. To ﬁnd the shadow value of
workers with tenure zero at each island we deﬁne the problem of an island’s planner that faces a
































subject to 0 ≤ Ej ≤ Tj for j =1 ,..,J and E0 ≤ ˆ U. Using this problem we deﬁne the value of an







|ˆ U=U . (2)
where ∂ˆ V/ ∂ˆ U is a subgradient of ˆ V i nt h ec a s ei tw h i c hi sn o td i ﬀerentiable. The next theorem
gives a characterization of the stationary eﬃcient allocations.
Theorem 1 .L e t(U,θ) be an arbitrary pair. Let V (·;U,θ) be the solution of the island planning
problem, and let G(·;U,θ) λ(·;U,θ) be the their associated optimal policies and shadow value for
zero tenure workers. Suppose that:
i) µ(·;U,θ) is a stationary distribution for the process (T,z) with transition functions given by
Q(z0|z) for z0 and by A(T,z) for T0.
ii) the value of search σ is given by
σ = β
Z
λ(T,z ;U,θ)µ(dT × dz ;U,θ)
iii)the number of agents engaged in home production N satisfy






µ(dT × dz ;U,θ) ≥ 0
iv)the labor force participation decisions are optimal, in the sense that
θ =m a x {σ, ω + βθ},
0=L [θ − ω + βθ].
Finally, deﬁne η(T,z)=µ(T|z), as the distribution of T conditional on z. Then {L,U,η} is an
eﬃcient stationary allocation.
12Conditions (i) and (ii) have been explained above. Condition (iii) deﬁnes the number of agents
doing home production as total population minus the sum of unemployment and employment, and
states that home production must be nonnegative. The ﬁrst equation in condition (iv) states that
the value of non-employment must be the best of two alternatives: the value of search, which is
σ, and the value of doing home production during the current period and being non-employed
the following period, which is ω + βθ. The second equation in condition (iv) is a complementary
slackness condition for home production.
Theorem 1 implies that characterizing eﬃcient stationary allocations is reduced to solving two
equations in two unknowns, and checking that an inequality is satisﬁed. Given an arbitrary pair
(U,θ),t h ef u n c t i o n sV (·,U,θ), G(·,U,θ), λ(·,U,θ), and the distribution µ(·,U,θ) can be found using
standard recursive techniques. Deﬁning σ(U,θ) and L(U,θ) as the left hand sides of conditions (ii)
and (iii), respectively, the two equations that U and θ must satisfy are:
θ =m a x {σ(U,θ),ω+ βθ}
0=L(U,θ)[θ − ω − βθ].
and the inequality that must be satisﬁed is thatL(U,θ) ≥ 0. A consequence of this simple char-
acterization is that Theorem 1 can be used for constructing a computational algorithm and for
establishing the existence and uniqueness of a stationary eﬃcient allocation.
The island planning problem is at the center of this characterization, so the next section turns
to its analysis.
4.1 Island’s planner problem
We start by analyzing the derivatives of V , which can be shown to be diﬀerentiable. The standard
proof by Benveniste and Scheikman does not apply because the optimal choice for E is not interior.
In Appendix B we construct an alternative proof and ﬁnd expressions for the derivatives of V .
Intuitively, the marginal value of an extra worker of tenure j is the sum of two terms. The ﬁrst
term is the sum of the expected discounted marginal productivity during those periods in which no
worker of the same cohort has ever been sent back to the central location. The second term is the
expected discounted net shadow value the ﬁr s tt i m et h a taw o r k e ro ft h es a m eh a sb e e ns e n tb a c k .
Formally, for Tj > 0,∂ V(T,z)/∂Tj = V ∗
j (T,z), where V ∗
j is deﬁne as follows. Denote the current
date by 0 and deﬁne the stopping time nj as the ﬁrst date s at which the number of workers with
13current tenure j is reduced. We let E∗
i,s be the optimal employment level s periods from now of
workers with tenure level i,a n dw el e tTi,s be the begining-of-period number of workers s periods
from now with tenure level i,s ot h a t
nj = ﬁrst date s at which E
∗
min{J, j+s},s <T min{J, j+s},s






















nj θ] − E0 [β
nj τ |nj ≥ J]
This implies that if some workers of tenure j are sent back, i.e. if Ej = Gj (T,z) <T j,t h e nt h e
marginal value of all workers of this tenure level is V ∗
j (T,z)=θ for j ≤ J − 1 and is equal to
θ − τ for j = J.
In Appendix A we show the following three properties of the solution to this problem.
First, it is immediate to show that if Tj > 0, then ∂V (T,z)/∂Tj ≥ θ for j ≤ J and ≥ θ − τ for
j = J, since the planner has the option of sending the workers back to the central location.
Second, it is easy to see that if a permanent worker is ﬁred, i.e. if EJ = GJ (T,z) <T J,t h e na l l
the temporary workers must have been ﬁred as well, i.e. Ej = Gj (T,z)=0 for all j =0 ,...,J−1. A
policy with this property saves on the separation cost τ, which are only paid by permanent workers.
The third important property is that the ﬁrst workers to be ﬁred are the temporary workers with
the longest tenure. The intuition for this property is that while all workers are perfect substitutes in
production, these workers are the closest to becoming subject to the separation cost τ,and thus this
policy saves on potential separation costs. In an economy where all islands planner have followed
this policy in the past, and a constant ﬂow U of tenure j =0workers has arrived every period,
the states T in the ergodic set take a particular form. Formally, the ergodic set is a subset of E,




J−1 × R+ : T =( U,...,U,Tj,0,...,0,T J), for some j :1 ≤ j ≤ J − 1
o
This property allow us to reduce the dimensionality of the endogenous state of the island planning
problem from J to 2. Hence we analyzed a simpliﬁed island planning problem, to which we turn
next.
144.2 Simpliﬁed Island’s planner problem
States for the island planning problem T that belong to E can be described by two numbers: t, the
total number of temporary workers (workers with tenure less or equal to J), and p, the number
permanent workers (workers with tenure greater than J ). We use this feature to consider the
island planning problem with a simpliﬁed state (t,p,z). In this simpliﬁed problem, the choices are
employment of temporary workers, et and employment of permanent workers ep. The law of motion
for the endogenous state is:
t
0 = U + et − max{et − (J − 1)U, 0} and p
0 = ep +m a x{et − (J − 1)U, 0} (4)
The number of temporary workers next period, t0, equals those that are employed this period, et, plus
those that arrive next period, U, net of those that will become permanent, max{et − (J − 1)U, 0}. Likewise,
the number of next period permanent workers, p0, equals those that are employed this period,
ep plus those temporary workers that will become permanent. The planner’s value function v :
[U,J · U] × R+ × Z satisﬁes
v(t,p,z)= m a x










0 ≤ et ≤ t, 0 ≤ ep ≤ p,
and the law of motion (4).
Formally, v is related to V for states T ∈ E is as follows:
v(T1 + T2 + ... + TJ−1,T J,z)=V (T1,T 2,...,TJ−1,T J,z).
Since v and V are closely related, and V is concave, then v is concave in (t,p), even though the
graph of the feasible set for this problem is not convex. From the deﬁnition of v and the properties
of V we have that v is diﬀerentiable with respect to t for all t>0 which are not integer multiples












15At the points t given by t = j × U for some j =1 ,...,J − 2, the right derivative of v with respect
to t is ∂V/∂Tj, and its left derivative is ∂V/∂Tj+1.
The main result of this section is the characterization of the optimal policies. The optimal
policy is characterized by a two-dimensional set of inaction I(z).F o r e a c h z, the optimal policy
(et (t,p,z),e p (t,p,z)) is to stay in the set of inaction I (z) and otherwise to go to its boundary,
as explained below. The boundary of the set of inaction is described by two continuous functions,
ˆ p and ˆ t deﬁned in ˆ p : Z → R+ and ˆ t : R+ × Z → [0,J· U]. The function ˆ t is decreasing in p and
hits zero at a value of p ≤ ˆ p(z). The function ˆ t is the boundary of the set of inaction for the values
t that are strictly positive. Formally, these functions deﬁne the set of inaction I (z) as follows:
Deﬁnition 2 For each z ∈ Z,
I (z)=
©
(t,p) ∈ [0,J· U] × R+ : p ≤ ˆ p(z), and t ≤ ˆ t(p,z)
ª
(5)
The optimal policy is as follows: if p ≤ ˆ p(z) and the state is outside the set of inaction I (z),
temporary workers are ﬁred until the boundary of I (z) is hit, with no change in permanent workers.
If p>ˆ p(z), all temporary workers are ﬁred, and permanent workers are ﬁred to hit ˆ p(z). Formally,





ep (t,p,z)=m i n {p, ˆ p(z)}
Figure 2 illustrates a typical shape of the Inaction set for a given z and the nature of the optimal
policy.
The threshold ˆ p(z) solves






so that ˆ p is lowest value of the permanent workers for which the marginal value of an extra permanent
worker is θ −τ, and hence if the island planner were to have one extra one, she will be returned to
the central location.
Given (p,z), the function ˆ t(p,z) is deﬁned as the lowest value of t for which the marginal value
of an extra temporary worker is θ, so that if the island planner were to have an extra temporary





























for ˆ t(p,z) ∈ ((J − 1)U,JU]. To simplify the exposition we have written the expressions assuming
that v is diﬀerentiable. If v is evaluated at integers multiples of U, so that v is not diﬀerentiable,
these expressions have to be written in terms of the subgradients of v.
The intuition for why the frontier of the set of inaction, given by ˆ t, is decreasing in p, is that
temporary and permanent workers are perfect substitutes in production. Indeed, it can be shown
that ˆ t is strictly decreasing for values of p such that ˆ t(p,z) is not an integer multiple of U. At the
points on which ˆ t is an integer multiple of U, this function can be ﬂat: on these point the function
v may not be diﬀerentiable, as explained above. While all these properties are quite intuitive, the
proofs are involved because of the non-diﬀerentiability of v, Appendix B contains a formal treatment
of these results.
5 Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
In this section we describe a convenient recursive competitive equilibrium (RCE) for this economy.
Without loss of generality, we consider the case where γ =0 , so that leisure and consumption
goods are perfect substitutes. We also treat the separation cost τ as being a technological feature
of the environment. In this version of the economy the 1st and 2nd welfare theorems hold, so
stationary equilibria can be found by computing the eﬃcient stationary equilibrium described in
Section 4. At the end of the section we explain how to map the equilibrium allocations obtained
in this case into equilibrium allocations for any γ>0. We also describe the mapping to the case
where the separation costs are ﬁring taxes rebated to households as lump-sum transfers and where,
consequently, the welfare theorems do not hold.
In a RCE ﬁrms and workers participate in competitive labor markets in each island. Wages are
indexed by j, the workers’s tenure in the island, and by (T,z), the island-wide state. As in the
previous sections, a permanent worker is deﬁned as having tenure j ≥ J in the island. Whenever
a ﬁrm decreases its employment of permanent workers, it must pay a separation cost τ per unit.
Notice that it is the tenure in the island, as opposed to tenure in the ﬁrm, what determines if a
worker separation is subject to the separation cost τ. This unrealistic assumption aﬀords tractability
by allowing a descentralization with spot labor markets. The reason is that, since the separation
18costs are at the island level, workers are not tied to the ﬁrms that hire them. Next section will
remove this unrealistic speciﬁcation by introducing long term contractual arrangements.
C u r r e n tw a g e sa c r o s st e n u r el e v e l sa r eg i v e nb y
w(T,z)=( w0 (T,z),w 1 (T,z),...,w J−1 (T,z),w J (T,z)),
a function of the island-wide state (T,z). The law of motion for wages can then be obtained from
the island-wide equilibrium employment rule and the associated law of motion for the island-wide
state. The equilibrium employment rule is denoted by
G(T,z) ≡ (G0 (T,z),G 1 (T,z),...,GJ−1 (T,z),G J (T,z)).
The law of motion for the endogenous state T0 = A(T,z) is then given by
A(T,z)=( G0 (T,z),G 1 (T,z),...,GJ−2 (T,z),G J−1 (T,z)+GJ (T,z)).
The problem for a worker with tenure j in an island of state (T,z) is to decide whether to become
non-employed or to stay and work. Becoming non-employed entails a value given by θ.B ys t a y i n g ,
the worker receives a wage rate wj during the current period and gains tenure min{j +1 ,J} for the
following period. We denote the value function for a tenure j worker in a (T,z) island as Wj (T,z).
This value function must solve








for all (T,z) and j =0 ,...,J.
The value function B (p;T,z) of a ﬁrm that employed p permanent workers during the previous























The optimal decision rule is denoted by
gj = mj (p;T,z),
19for 0 ≤ j ≤ J, describing the optimal employment level at each tenure j. For future reference,
notice that B (p;T,z) is decreasing in p, since having employed more permanent workers in the
previous period makes the ﬁrm subject to higher potential separation costs. Thus, provided that
B is diﬀerentiable, −τ ≤ ∂B/∂p ≤ 0, and ∂B/∂p = −τ if some permanent workers are ﬁred, i.e. if
gJ = mJ (p;T,z) <p .
A recursive stationary competitive equilibrium (RCE) is given by numbers {θ,U,σ} and func-
tions {w,G,B,m,W} that satisfy the following conditions:
i).Given wages w(·), employment G(·), and the law of motion A(·), the representative ﬁrm is
representative:
mj (TJ;T,z)=Gj (T,z),
for all (T,z) and all 0 ≤ j ≤ J;a n d
ii). Given wages w(·), employment G(·) and law of motion A(·) the decision of the representative
worker is representative:
Wj (T,z) >θ ⇒ Gj (T,z)=Tj, for j>0 and
W0 (T,z) >θ ⇒ G0 (T,z)=U.

















iv) Feasibility in the labor market is satisﬁed:
N − U −
Z
G(T,z)µ(dT × dz) ≥ 0,U ≥ 0,
v) The value of search σ and the value of becoming non-employed θ satisfy
σ = β
Z
W0 (T,z)µ(dT × dz),θ =m a x{ω + βθ, σ}
20vi) The labor force participation decision is optimal:
0=
∙




[θ − ω − βθ]
0=U [θ − σ] .
The next theorem establishes the 1st and 2nd welfare theorem for this economy and provides a
partial characterization of the RCE.
Theorem 3 Welfare Theorems and equilibrium characterization:
i) Let {U,θ,w,G,B,m,W,µ} be an recursive stationary equilibrium, then there is an island planner
value function V, for which {V,G,U,θ,µ} is an stationary eﬃcient allocation.
ii) Conversely, let {V,G,U,θ,µ} be a stationary eﬃcient allocation, then there are wages and value
functions {w,B,m,W} for which {U,θ,w,E,B,m,W,µ} is a recursive stationary equilibrium.
iii) the functions B,W and V related as in i) and ii) satisfy
Wj (T,z)=∂V (T,z)/∂Tj for j =0 ,...,J − 1 (6)
∂B(TJ,T,z)/∂p + WJ (T,z)=∂V (T,z)/∂TJ
The reasons for the equivalence shown in i) and ii) are the same as in the Prescott and Mehra
(1980) result about equivalence between recursive competitive equilibrium and eﬃcient allocations.
Our set up does not directly maps into theirs, so in Appendix C we oﬀer a constructive proof of i)
and ii).
Condition iii) are obtained by comparing the ﬁrst order conditions from the planning problem
with the optimality conditions for the workers and ﬁrms in the recursive competitive equilibrium.
These conditions give some intuition on how the prices decentralize the eﬃcient allocation. Recall
that ∂V/∂Tj is the shadow value of a tenure j worker in the island planning problem. Condition
iii) says that the shadow value of an extra temporary worker for the planner is the same as the
equilibrium value function Wj. Instead the shadow value of a permanent worker for the planer,
∂V/∂Tj, is lower than the equilibrium value function for a worker WJ. This diﬀerence is exactly the
shadow value of an extra permanent worker for the ﬁrm, ∂B/∂p, which, due to the separation cost,
is a number between −τ and 0.
The next proposition gives a partial characterization of equilibrium wages.
21Proposition 4 Let {U,θ,w,G,B,m,W,µ} be an recursive stationary equilibrium. Without loss
of generality, the equilibrium wage w can be chosen to satisfy








b) for all j =0 ,1,...,J − 2
wj (T,z) − βτ ≤ wJ−1 (T,z) ≤ wj (T,z)
wj (T,z) − βτ ≤ wJ (T,z) ≤ wj (T,z)+τ
wJ−1 (T,z) ≤ wJ (T,z) ≤ wJ−1 (T,z)+τ
and if EJ (T,z) <T J :
wJ−1 (T,z) ≤ wj (T,z) <w J (T,z),
c) and the equilibrium value function W for workers can be chosen so that they satisfy:
W0 (T,z) ≥ W1 (T,z) ≥ ···≥ WJ−1 (T,z)
WJ (T,z) ≥ WJ−1 (T,z) .
This proposition says that there are three equilibrium levels of wages in a given location: one
level for temporary workers with tenures j =0 ,...,J−2, a second level for workers that are about to
become permanent, i.e. those with tenure J −1, and a third level of wages for permanent workers,
i.e. those with tenure J or higher.
Temporary workers with tenures j =0to j = J − 2 are hired in spot markets and paid their
marginal productivity. Wages of workers with tenure J−1, i.e. those that would become permanent
if they were to work during the current period, are (weakly) smaller than their marginal productivity.
This gives the right incentive to workers and ﬁrms. They give the incentive to workers to leave the
location as their tenure gets closer to J −1, as condition c) makes precise. Firms do not hire them
spite of the low wages because if they do so, the ﬁrms will be subject to separation cost in the
future. Wages of permanent workers are (weakly) higher than those with tenure J − 1.T h i sa l s o
gives the right incentives to workers and ﬁrms. They induce workers with tenures J and higher to
stay in the location, as condition c) explicitly shows. This is consistent with the ﬁrms decision of
ﬁring permanent workers last in order to avoid the separation tax τ.
22The proof of Proposition 4 follows, essentially, from the analysis of the ﬁrst order conditions of
the ﬁrm problem. Appendix C contains a joint proof of Theorem 3 and Proposition 4.
Stationary Equilibrium for γ>0 and separation taxes
Here we describe how to use the stationary allocation obtained in the case where γ =0and the
separation cost is a technological feature of the environment, to ﬁnd the equilibrium for the case
where γ>0 and the separation cost τ is a tax levied to ﬁrms and rebated lump sum to households.
First we describe how the equilibrium conditions for the households change when γ>0. We
assume that there are perfect insurance markets, so that all households consume the same amount,
equal to the aggregate consumption level, which we denote as c. The household ﬁrst order condition
for an interior equilibrium (one with a strictly positive amount of time dedicated to leisure and a




=( 1− β)σ. (7)
In such interior equilibrium the value of search equates the value of non-employment, so that σ = θ.
Second, we describe how the equilibrium changes when the separation cost τ is a tax, rebated
lump sum to households, as opposed to a technological cost. In this case aggregate consumption in









µ(dT × dz) (8)
Given these changes, the allocation corresponding to an interior stationary equilibrium can be
described by {V,G,U,θ,µ}, where V is the value function and G the optimal policy for the island
planning problem for (U,θ), and where µ is the invariant distribution for {(T,z)} generated by
(G,Q) such that:












⎦ µ(dT × dz ;U,θ)
where ˆ V is deﬁned in terms of V as in (1),
b) the marginal condition (7) holds where aggregate consumption is given by (8).
Alternatively we could have deﬁned an equilibrium for γ>0 with separation taxes in terms of
the ﬁr m sa n dw o r k e r sp r o b l e m ,a sw eh a v ed o n ef o rt h eR C E .W ec h o s et od e ﬁne it in terms of the
23stationary allocations to simplify the notation. Using the arguments in Theorem 3, it is easy to
show that the two deﬁnitions would have been equivalent.
Finding a Stationary Equilibrium with γ>0 and separation taxes
Now we describe how to obtain the allocations corresponding to an equilibrium with γ>0 and
separation taxes using the stationary eﬃcient allocations for γ =0 .S t a r t a n e ﬃcient stationary
equilibrium described by {V,G,U,θ,µ} and with aggregate consumption c(U,θ) given by the right
hand side of (8). Let (U0,θ
0) satisfy
U
0 = φU and θ
0 = φ
α−1 θ (9)




−γ =( 1− β) θ
0 . (10)
We claim that such (U0,θ
0) and its associated island planning problem value function of optimal
decision rules {V 0,G 0} and invariant distribution µ0, describe the allocations for an equilibrium with
γ>0 and separation taxes.
The key to this result is the following homogeneity property of the stationary eﬃcient allocations.
Homogeneity Property. Let the pair (U,θ) index an island planning problem with value function







Then, in the case of Cobb-Douglas production function F (E,z)=zE α, one can easily verify that









Using this homogeneity property and the value of φ given in (10), it is immediate to verify that
one obtains an equilibrium for γ with separation taxes.
246 Interpretation of separation cost as temporary contracts
In the previous section the separation cost was modeled as a tax on employment reductions of
workers with tenure j ≥ J at the island level. This allowed for a very simple competitive structure
with spot labor markets. However, in reality, temporary contracts specify severance payments as a
function of the workers’ tenure at the ﬁrm level. Modeling severance payments as separation taxes
in the context of competitive equilibria is standard in the literature, (see for instance Bentolila and
Bertola, 1990, and Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993). However modelling the tenure level at the
island level (as opposed to the ﬁrm level) is speciﬁc to this paper. In this section we introduce an
alternative and more realistic deﬁnition of a competitive equilibrium that speciﬁe st h et e n u r eo f
workers at the ﬁrm level. This speciﬁcation ties workers with ﬁrms, and hence requires long term
contracting to achieve eﬃciency. In fact, we will argue that the competitive equilibrium with long
term contrats and tenure at the ﬁrm level supports the same equilibrium allocation as the RCE of
the previous section. This is an important result: There is no loss of realism in specifying that the
tenure relevant for temporary contracts is at the islands level instead of the ﬁrm level.
To obtain this equivalence result certain restrictions on the type of temporary contracts allowed
are needed. However, this is not a weakness of the model. On the contrary, these restrictions
resemble those observed in actual countries. Temporary contracts have often been introduced with
the purpose of reducing unemployment by encouraging hiring, yet retaining employment protection
in the form of ﬁring costs. Thus the implementation of temporary contracts have typically included
restrictions such as eligibility clauses. Indeed the Spanish reform of 1984, which broadened the
scope of ﬁxed term contracts, speciﬁed that workers must be registered as unemployed to be eligible
to be hired under a temporary employment contract (see the Appendix in Cabrales and Hopenhayn,
1997).2 In Portugal temporary contracts can only be used by new ﬁrms, or by ﬁrms hiring the long
term unemployed or ﬁrst-time job seekers (see Table 1 in Dolado et. al, 2001).
To incorporate this type of elegibility restrictions we assume not only that the separation taxes
2Cabrales and Hopenhayn (1997) describes the elegibility requirements of "Fixed term employment promotion
contracts" (which includes: "general ﬁxed-term employment promotion contracts", "contracts, work practice and
formation", "social collaboration contracts"), "indeﬁnite length employment promotion contracts" (which includes
"indeﬁnite length contracts for the older-than-45", "indeﬁnite length contracts for women in underepresented occu-
pations", "indeﬁnite length contracts for younger than 25 or between 25 and 29"). Only "indeﬁnite length contracts
for the handicapped" are exempt from the requirement of being previously a registered unemployed.
25are assessed based on the tenure of the workers at the ﬁrm’s level (as opposed to the island level), but
that only workers that searched during the previous period (i.e. that were unemployed) are eligible
to be hired under temporary contracts. If a ﬁrm hires a worker that was employed somewhere
else in the island during the previous period, the worker becomes subject to regular ﬁring taxes
immediately.3 In this scenario, the market structure would have to be changed to accommodate for
the fact that workers would try to exploit the bargaining power that they would gain by staying in
as a m eﬁrm. To avoid this, we assume that ﬁrms and workers participate in island-wide competitive
markets for binding, long-term, state-contingent, wage contracts at the time of hiring. Below we
oﬀer an informal description of the equilibrium using long term contracts and Appendix F provides
a more formal treatment.
6.1 Binding contracts and tenure at the ﬁrm level (an informal descrip-
tion)
In this decentralization, ﬁrms and workers trade state contingent contracts in competitive labor
markets, specifying the periods of time that the worker will supply labor to the ﬁrm as a function
of the sequence of productivity shocks zt. Since employment must be continuous over time, each
contingent contracts is eﬀectively reduced to a stopping time specifying the time of separation.
These stopping times are perfectly enforceable. When the realized sequence of productivity shocks
triggers a separation, the worker can choose to oﬀer a new stopping time to the market or to leave
the island and receive the outside value θ. Each stopping time has its own price, which is taken as
given by ﬁrms and workers.
There are two type of workers in the island: "incumbent" workers and "new arrivals". An
"incumbent" is a worker that has been previously employed by some ﬁrm in the island. A "new
arrival" is a worker that has just arrived to the island for the ﬁr s tt i m e .T h es t o p p i n gt i m e ss o l d
3While the restrictions that we impose in the model captures the speciﬁc elegibility clauses in Portugal and Spain,
it is clear that in general actual regulations must somehow preclude the possibility of ﬁrms completely avoiding the
ﬁring penalties by reshuﬄing workers. To be concrete, think of the following extreme case: a ﬁrm that divides itself
into two units and every period it ﬁres all the workers from each unit and hires them in the other. In this way, the
tenure of its workforce is always zero and, hence, the separation tax does not apply. The assumption used in Section
5t h a tﬁring taxes are assessed based on worker’s tenure at the island level can also be thought as a one type of
restriction that precludes ﬁrms from following this type of scheme.
26by the diﬀerent type of workers diﬀer in terms of the separation costs involved. In particular, the
stopping times sold by "new arrivals" are subject to the separation cost τ only if the separation
occurs after J periods (the length of the trial periods in the ﬁxed term contracts). On the contrary,
the stopping times sold by "incumbents" are always subject to the separation cost τ.S i n c e t h e
stopping times sold by the diﬀerent types of workers are diﬀerent commodities they have, in general,
diﬀerent prices. Intuitively, a stopping time sold by an "incumbent" worker will have a lower price
than the same stopping time sold by a "new arrival" to compensate ﬁrms for the potentially higher
separation costs.
Taking prices as given, ﬁrms decide how many stopping times of each type to purchase from the
diﬀerent type of workers. Their objective is to maximize the expected present value of their proﬁts,
net of separation costs.
Despite the unusual commodities traded and the indivisibility in the supply of contracts, the
competitive equilibrium considered is standard and, hence, the welfare theorems hold. The equi-
librium allocation can then be characterized as the solution to a social planner’s problem. In this
problem, the planner chooses stopping times for "incumbents" and "new arrivals" taking into ac-
count that the separation cost τ applies to "incumbent" workers in every separation, but that it
applies to "new arrivals" only in separations that take place after J periods of employment.
A brief analysis of the planner’s problem will help understand the equivalence between this type
of equilibrium and the one considered in the main text of the paper. Clearly, the social planner will
never want to separate a "newly arrived" worker and rehire him as a an "incumbent" before the
trial period for the ﬁxed term contracts is over. The reason is that being rehired as "incumbent"
makes the worker liable to separation costs, while maintaining his "newly arrived" status saves on
separation costs during the trial period. Also, the social planner will never want to separate a
"newly arrived" worker after the trial period is over and rehire him under an "incumbent" contract
because this entails incurring the separation cost τ without any beneﬁt. As a consequence, the
planner will choose the stopping times for "newly arrived" workers in such a way that they separate
only to leave the island (and receive the value θ). This means that the social planner will never use
"incumbent" workers.
Being left with only "newly arrived" workers, the planner’s problem is formally identical to the
Island’s Planner problem described in Section 4. This has an important implication: The allocation
obtained in the competitive equilibrium with long term contracts and tenure at the ﬁrm level
described in this section is identical to the one obtained in the competitive equilibrium with spot
27labor contracts and tenure at the island level that was described in Section 5. Moreover, the price
of a stopping time sold by a "new arrival" (in the equilibrium with binding contracts and tenure at
the ﬁrm level) must be equal to the expected discounted value of the spot wages (in the equilibrium
with spot labor contracts and tenure at the island level of Section 5) obtained by a worker that
arrives to the island for the ﬁrst time and follows an employment plan described by that stopping
time.
7C o m p u t a t i o n a l E x p e r i m e n t s
In this section we calibrate our economy to evaluate the long-run consequences of introducing tem-
porary employment contracts. Temporary contracts have been introduced in a number of countries
with high employment protection policies as a way of providing ﬁrms some ﬂexibility in the process
of hiring and ﬁring workers. The reform of the Spanish labor market during the mid-eighties is per-
haps the most extreme case, given the scope of the temporary contracts introduced (see Cabrales
and Hopenhayn, 1997, or Alonso-Borrego et all, 2004). To assess the extent by which temporary
contracts add ﬂexibility to the labor market we calibrate our economy to one with high separa-
tion taxes and no temporary contracts, such as the Spanish economy previous to the 1984 reform.
This benchmark case, which we refer to as the “ﬁring-tax case", is obtained by setting J =1and
τ>0.4 Using the parameter values calibrated in the ﬁring-tax case, we compute competitive equi-
libria under temporary employment contracts of diﬀerent lengths, i.e. with diﬀerent values for J,
and evaluate their eﬀects.
For comparison purposes we also compute the equilibrium allocation under zero separation taxes,
which we refer to as the “laissez-faire" case. This is an interesting case to consider because, as we
argue below, the equilibrium allocations with temporary employment contracts of long duration
coincide with the equilibrium allocation for the laissez-faire case. Based on this property, we compare
how much of the gap between the ﬁring-tax and laissez-faire cases is closed by introducing temporary
contracts of diﬀerent lenght J.
Before describing our calibration, we state two properties that will be useful for interpreting the
results.
4Consider an equilibrium with J =1and τ>0. Since J =1 , the dismissal of anyone that has worked, even for
one period, triggers a separation tax τ. Thus in this case there are no temporary workers.
28The laissez-faire case.
In the laissez-faire case, which is obtained by setting τ =0 ,t h ev a l u eo fJ as well as the
tenure levels of the diﬀerent workers are immaterial since temporary and permanent workers become
perfect substitutes. This means that while total employment is uniquely determined, the hiring
and ﬁring rates across the diﬀerent tenure levels are undetermined. Despite of this, we choose to
focus on the employment adjustments obtained as the limit when τ → 0 (or equivalently, when
τ is arbitrarily small). This is useful because it helps emphasize the type of adjustments that
temporary contracts lead to, even in the case where they are totally unimportant. The employment
adjustments in the laissaiz-faire case are characterized by the functions ˆ t and ˆ p obtained as the limit
when τ → 0. The limit functions ˆ t and ˆ p have the following three properties for each value of z:1 )
ˆ t(ˆ p(z) − JU,z)=JU , 2) ˆ t has slope -1 with respect to p, and 3) ˆ t(ˆ p(z),z)=ˆ p(z).
Temporary contracts as J →∞ .
To simplify the argument, assume that z is bounded. Let (U∗,θ
∗) be the equilibrium values
corresponding to the laissez-faire case, i.e. to τ =0 ,a n dl e tp∗ be an upper bound on the size of
ﬁrms under the invariant distribution for this case. For instance we take
p
∗ =m a x
z∈Z
ˆ pLF (z)
where ˆ pLF (z) is the employment threshold for permanent workers in the island planning problem
for (U∗,θ
∗) and τ =0(the laissez-faire case).
Now consider the length J∗ given by the smallest integer such that J∗U>p ∗. We claim
that regardless of the value of τ, if J ≥ J∗ the pair (U∗,θ
∗) and the associated island planning
problem value function, optimal policies and invariant distribution, constitute a stationary eﬃcient
allocation. The idea is quite simple: with such a large J, ﬁrms can replicate completely the
employment decisions under the laissez-faire case using only temporary workers, and hence the
value of the separation tax τ becomes immaterial.
Calibration
We calibrate the model to an economy with high employment protection and no temporary
contracts that resembles the Spanish economy previous to the 1984 reform. In terms of policy
parameters, we set τ equal to one year of average wages and J =1 .O u r c h o i c e o f τ reﬂects the
expected discounted cost (at the time that a worker is hired) of dismising a woker, which is the
measure proposed by Heckman and Pages-Serra (2000). In Appendix G we compute this measure
for the policies in place in Spain before 1984.
29We use a value α =0 .64 for the share parameter in the production function, which roughly
corresponds to the labor share. This choice implicitely assumes that that all other factors, such
as capital, are ﬁxed across locations. We use a quarterly time period, so we choose β =0 .96 to
generate an annual interest rate of 4 percent.
For z we use a discrete Markov chain approximation to the following AR(1) process:
logz
0 = ρlogz + σε ,
where ε is a standard normal. We choose the values of ρ and σ s ot h a tt h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ei sj u s t
a b o v e6 . 7 5%a n dt h ed u r a t i o no fu n e m p l o y m e n ti sj u s ta b o v e1y e a r .T h ee x a c tv a l u e st h a tw eu s e
are ρ =0 .955 and σ2 =0 .075, which correspond to a discrete approximation that uses six truncated
values for z so that the absolute value of ε never exceeds two standard deviations. The quarterly
ﬁring rate (total separations divided by employment) is 1.77% (Garcia-Fontes and Hopenhayn, 1996,
estimate a ﬁring rate of 1.84% per quarter for the years 1978-1984). Our choices are meant to capture
the situation in Spain before the 1984 reform. The reason why we chose a lower unemployment
rate and a lower duration of unemployment than those observed in Spain is that we are abstracting
from the unemployment insurance system. In Alvarez and Veracierto (1999) we analyzed the eﬀects
of introducing unemployment insurance beneﬁts into the model with ﬁring taxes, ﬁnding that they
increase the unemployment rate and the average duration of unemployment quite signiﬁcantly.5
Given these results, we believe that, in the context of this model, it is reasonable to calibrate to
the values for unemployment rate and average duration of unemployment described above.
We report the equilibrium for diﬀerent values of γ. For each value of γ we use a diﬀerent value of
the parameter ω so that labor force participation is always 65% in the benchmark case, and hence
t h ee m p l o y m e n tr a t ei s6 0 . 6 % .6The rest of the parameters are the same for each pair (γ,ω).
We have currently calibrated to a quarterly period to conserve on grid points in our numerical
implementation of the simpliﬁed island planning problem. In this case the search technology is
5See the analysis of section "UI beneﬁts, ﬁring subsidies, ﬁring taxes and severance payments" which considers the
net eﬀects of unemployment insurance beneﬁts and ﬁring taxes, and the results in Table 5 of Alvarez and Veracierto
(1999).
6The diﬀerent combinations of (γ,ω) are: (0, 1.3047), (1/2, 1.0739), (1, 0.883) and (8, 0.058). With γ =0 , there
are no income eﬀects, since preferences are linear. With γ =1 , income and substitution eﬀects of a permanent increase
in wages cancel. With γ =8 , t h ei n c o m ee ﬀects is much higher, so that the uncompensated labor supply elasticity
is lower, similar to the ones estimated by Nickel (19??).
30such that workers get at most one oﬀer per quarter. We view our current calibration as tentative
s i n c ew eh a v en o ty e te x p l o r e dw h a ta r et h ee m p i r i c a l l yr e a s o n a b l ev a l u e sf o rt h en u m b e ro fo ﬀers
per-period.7
Experiments
We compute the stationary equilibria, which we refer to as “the general equilibrium case” for
diﬀerent values of J, the length of temporary contracts. We compare the eﬀect of varying J against
the benchmark case of ﬁring taxes and against the laissez-faire case. Recall that for J large enough,
the equilibrium allocation with temporary contracts coincides with the laissez-faire one. Thus, this
comparison allows us to see how much ﬂexibility is added by increasing the length of temporary
contracts.
We also compute the allocations that correspond to the laissez-faire case for diﬀerent values of
J. As explained above, the value of J is immaterial for the allocation, but we concentrate on the
employment dynamics that correspond to a very small value of τ or, formally, to the limit when
τ → 0.
Finally, for comparisons purposes, we compute statistics for what we refer to as the “partial
equilibrium” case. For each J, this corresponds to the equilibrium for an industry that takes as
given the value of search θ and the number of new arrivals U. This equilibrium is constructed
by solving the island planning problem keeping ﬁxed the values θ and U that correspond to the
benchmark case, i.e. the equilibrium with ﬁring taxes. Comparing the statistics for the partial
equilibrium case with the general equilibrium case gives the eﬀects of the endogenous changes in
θ and U as the length of the temporary contracts changes.
Given the homogeneity property described in section 5, a number of statistics are independent of
the intertemporal substitution parameter 1/γ. In particular, those that refer to magnitudes relative
to unemployment, employment or the labor force, such as the unemployment rate, the average
duration of unemployment and ﬁring rates, are the same in all cases. We start by describing
the eﬀects of temporary contracts on this set of common statistics. Without loss of generality we
set γ =0 . This is the simplest case to understand because consumption and leisure are perfect
substitutes, and thus the equilibrium value of θ is ω/(1 − β), a parameter independent of the
policies.
7An alternative speciﬁcation for the search technology that allows for more ﬂexibility in terms of the number of
oﬀers per-period is to assume that if U workers search per period, only pUarrive to the islands.
31Figure 3 shows the eﬀects of the diﬀerent policies on the unemployment rate. In the context of
our model we deﬁne the unemployment rate as ur = U/(U +E). In this and all subsequent ﬁgures,
the eﬀects are depicted as a function of the length of the temporary contracts J. The equilibrium
for J =1corresponds to the benchmark case with ﬁring taxes and no temporary contracts. The
unemployment rate in the laissez-faire case is almost 2.5 percent higher than in the benchmark case.
This is a feature common to many other search models: ﬁring taxes deter ﬁring and hiring, but the
largest eﬀect is on the ﬁring margin. The intuition for this diﬀerence is that the eﬀect of the ﬁring
taxes on hiring is mitigated by time discounting. In the partial equilibrium case the unemployment
rate does not change much with the length of the temporary contracts J, so the general equilibrium
eﬀects are important to understand the eﬀect on the unemployment rate.








FIGURE 3: Unemployment Rate
























* J = 1 : Firing Taxes
G.E. τ = 1 year w
G.E. τ -> 0
P.E. τ = 1 year w
Partial Eq. τ = 1 year w        .
Gen. Eq. τ = 1 year w
Laissez Faire,  τ -> 0
In the general equilibrium case the unemployment rate increases with the length of the temporary
contracts J. With temporary contracts of 3 years ( J =1 2 ) ,t h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ei s1 . 3p e r c e n t
points higher than with ﬁring taxes, about half way in closing the gap between the benchmark case
and laissez-faire case. In the data the pattern between the level of unemployment and the presence
of temporary contracts is not clear. Dolado et all (2001) survey the literature and conclude that the
Spanish evidence support that the eﬀects of temporary contracts is a “neutral of slightly positive
32eﬀect on unemployment". To better understand the eﬀect of temporary contracts in unemployment
in the model (Figure 3) it is helpful to decompose the changes in the unemployment rate ur into
changes in the ﬁring rate (Figure 4) and changes in the average duration of unemployment (Figure
5).
In Figure 4 we plot the value for the ﬁring rate fr,deﬁned as total ﬁring over total employment.
Recall that for the laissez-faire and the partial equilibrium cases, the values for U and θ are constant
across all J. As it should be expected, the ﬁring rates for laissez-faire are higher than the ones for
the partial equilibrium case for all values of J. Notice that the ﬁring rates in these two cases are
increasing in J, with a large jump at J =2 . To understand this pattern we concentrate on the
laissez-faire case where the employment in each island stays constant. Recall that we compute
employment by tenure in the laissez-faire case as the limit for an equilibrium with τ → 0.T h e
increase in the ﬁring rate helps to avoid the (arbitrarily small) separation tax. The ﬁring rate
jumps between J =1and J =2because with J =2the temporary workers with longest tenure
are ﬁred and replaced by newly arrived workers. This reshuﬄing cannot be done with J =1 . The
smooth increase in the ﬁring rate with J is due to the fact that with higher J ﬁrms can accumulate
a larger proportion of their workforce as temporary workers. With this larger proportion, if they
need to decrease total employment they can do so at the same time that they hire newly arrived
workers.8 Notice that the pattern of ﬁring rates as a function of J for the partial equilibrium case,
where the separation cost are substantial (one year of average wages), is the same as in the laissez
faire case, with essentially zero ﬁring taxes.
8To understand this it is helpful to consider the case of an island where an increase in J = J0 to J = J0+1triggers
an increase in ﬁring. Suppose that the island suﬀers a negative shock in z and that for J0 the number of temporary
workers in the island is just enough to make the adjustment in total employment purely ﬁring temporary workers,
without resorting to ﬁre any permanent worker. If we now consider the case of J = J0 +1 , then there will be
more temporary workers than needed to make the adjustment in total employment. In this case the island can ﬁre
temporary workers in excess of what is needed to make the adjsutment in total employment, and hire some newly
arrived workers.











FIGURE 4: Firing Rate
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The value for the ﬁring rate for the general equilibrium case lies in between the value for the
partial equilibrium case and the one for the laissez-faire case, and it gets closer to the one for the
laissez-faire case as J increases. To understand why the value for the general equilibrium case
lies between the other two cases, notice that the equilibrium value of U is higher in the general
equilibrium case than in the partial equilibrium case, and that U increases with J.T h e v a l u e o f
U is larger than in the partial equilibrium because as J increases there are less impediments to
labor mobility. With fewer impediments, the shadow value of a worker in the production sector
increases, which induces a larger fraction of the population to search. Since in general equilibrium
ﬁrms receive a higher ﬂow of newly arrived workers (i.e. a higher U), they can engage more in the
replacement of temporary workers of high tenure by newly arrived workers to save on separation
costs.
The quarterly ﬁring rate for the general equilibrium case goes from 1.77% for J =1to 5.1%
for J =1 2 , which are roughly similar to the ones for Spain before and after 1984: Garcia-Fontes
and Hopenhayn (1996) estimate quarterly ﬁring rates of 1.84% during t h es i xy e a r sp r i o rt ot h e
extension of temporary contracts, and of 4.8% for the six years after. The model overestimate these
eﬀects a bit, since comparing the eﬀect in the model for J =1with J =1 2does not corresponds
34exactly to Spain before and after 1984, since before 1984 some temporary contracts were allowed,
as we explain below.
Figure 5 shows the average duration of unemployment d, deﬁned as d =( 1 /fr) ur / (1 −
ur). The three cases display similar values. There is a large drop in the average duration between
the benchmark case and J =2 . This is the result of the increase in hiring of newly arrived workers, as
explained in the case of Figure 4. Since d is similar for the three cases, the eﬀects on unemployment
are accounted for the behavior of ﬁring rates discussed above. Notice that, as opposed to the
jumps at J =2for the ﬁring rate and average duration of unemployment, the increase in the
unemployment rate for the general equilibrium is smooth (compare Figure 3 with Figures 4 and 5).
This is because for J =2 , the sharp decrease in the average duration of unemployment coincides
with a sharp increase in the ﬁring rate.








FIGURE 5: Average Duration of Unemployment
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Figure 6 displays the fraction of permanent workers in total employment for the general equi-
librium and the laissez-faire cases. The fraction of permanent workers is higher for the general
equilibrium case than for the laissez-faire case, since in the general equilibrium case ﬁrms retain
more permanent workers to avoid the high separation cost. Nevertheless, the fraction of permanent
workers is very similar in the two cases. Notice also that as J increases, the fraction of permanent
35workers decreases steadily. For J =1 2 , which corresponds to temporary contracts of 3 years, 33
percent of workers are in temporary contracts. In Europe in the nineties, the fraction of workers
with temporary contracts has been increasing steadily over time to about 12 percent, reaching its
highest value for Spain. In Spain this fraction went from 11 percent before 1984 to an average of
33 percent during the nineties.
Figure 7 displays the ﬁring rates by tenure of employment for temporary contracts of length
J =8in the general equilibrium and laissez-faire cases. As in Figure 6, the values are very similar
for both cases. The ﬁring rates are initially decreasing in tenure, due to a compositional eﬀect.
For j = J − 1, F i g u r e7s h o w sas p i k ei nﬁring, due to the high ﬁring rate of the temporary
workers with the highest tenure. The ﬁring rate for permanent workers is the smallest of all. This
pattern is similar to the one estimated in the data by Cabrales and Hopenhayn in Spain after the
generalization of this contracts, which we have reproduced above.9









FIGURE 6: Share of Permanent Workers in Total Employment for differentg contract length J
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FIGURE 7: Average Firing by Tenure
For J = 8


























τ = 1 year of wages
limit as τ -> 0
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limit as τ -> 0
Notice that the patterns displayed in Figures 5, 6 and 7 for the average duration of unemploy-
ment, share of permanent workers in total employment, and the ﬁring rate by tenure are similar to
the ones found in Spain after the mid-eighties and have typically being interpreted as evidence that
temporary contracts play an important role. However, in our model similar patterns are obtained
for τ equal to one year of average wages as well as for τ arbitrarily small, which shows that in
on its itself, large changes in turnover do not necesarilly entails large changes in welfare relevant
variables, such as employment, unemployment, aggregate consumption and productivity. We obtain
this result under the extreme assumption that workers with diﬀerent tenure are perfect substitutes.
9This pattern is present in the calibrated model for J ≤ 9. F o rh i g h e rv a l u e si ti sm u c hn o i s y .
36Under a diﬀerent speciﬁcation, such as on the job learning, this result will not be obtained. In
particular, if the eﬀect of on the job learning is large enough, small separation cost may have very
small eﬀect on turnover rates. Nevertheless, we interpret the spike in ﬁgure 1 for tenure of about 3
years, as evidence that the eﬀects of separation taxes are not completely outweigh by the learning.
10We leave the examination of a model that incorporate both features for future work.
Figure 8 shows the behavior of employment for the general equilibrium case for diﬀerent values of
γ. As J increases there are both income and substitution eﬀects. The income eﬀe c ti sd u et ot h ef a c t
that as J increases ﬁr m sh a v em o r eﬂe x i b i l i t ya n dt h u sw o r k i n gi nt h em a r k e ti sm o r ea t t r a c t i v e ,i . e .
the equilibrium value of θ increases. The income eﬀect is due to the fact that the economy is more
productive. For low values of γ, the substitution eﬀect dominates and thus aggregate employment
increases with J.F o rl o wv a l u e so fγ the income eﬀect dominates and thus aggregate employment
decreases with J.
Figure 9 displays output and employment for the general equilibrium case for γ =1and com-
pares its value with the ones in the laissez-faire case. Notice that while output seems to converge
monotonically to the laissez-faire case, employment does not seem to have converged to the laissez-
f a i r ec a s ef o rJ =1 2 . Indeed, the value of employment for the general equilibrium case seems to
overshoot the laissez faire value. This is a sign that even for J =1 2 , i.e. temporary contracts of
length 3 years, the allocation is in some dimensions far away from converging to the laissez-faire
c a s e .T h i sc a na l s ob es e e ni nF i g u r e6 ,t h a ts h o w st h ef o rJ =1 2the fraction of permanent workers
for J =1 2is still about 65 percent (recall that for τ>0, the allocation converges to laissez-faire
when the fraction of permanent workers goes to zero).
10With on the job learning and ﬁring cost, if the eﬀect of learning is strong enough, it will not be optimal for
the ﬁrm to ﬁre ﬁrst the temporary workers with higher tenure. In this case, the spike at the end of the ﬁxed term
contracts shown for Spain in Figure 1 will not obtain.









FIGURE 8: Equilibrium Employment for different values of  γ
For τ = 1 year of wages
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FIGURE 9: Output and Labor Force for  γ = 1
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Figure 10 displays the welfare cost of temporary contracts of diﬀerent lengths. This ﬁgure
plots the extra perpetual consumption ﬂow needed to make the representative household indiﬀerent
between living in the economy with temporary contracts of length J and living in the laissez-faire
economy. This calculation compares the stationary equilibrium of the two economies, and hence
d o e sn o tt a k ei n t oa c c o u n tt h et r a n s i t i o na f t e rac h a n g ei np o l i c y .F o rt h es a m eJ, the welfare cost
are higher for smaller γ, since in this case there is more substitution between consumption and
leisure. For J =1 , Figure 10 shows the welfare cost of ﬁring taxes, which are about 2.5 percent.
This number is similar to the one found by Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and by Veracierto
(2001). As J increases the welfare cost decreases: it goes from about 2.5 percent for length of a
quarter and decreases smoothly with J until a value of 1 percent for contract length of 3 years, or
J =1 2 . Thus, even if some of the characteristic of the allocation (such as employment in ﬁgure 9)
do not converge monotonically to their laissez faire value as J increases, the welfare cost, which in
a sense takes all the relevant features into consideration, does converges monotonically.








Figure 10: Welfare Cost of Contracts





J=1 is the Firing Tax case
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iAppendix A: Analysis of the Island Planning Problem
The next set of results establish that the ﬁxed point V = H [V ], the ﬁxed point of the corresponding Bellman
equation, is diﬀerentiable and that its derivatives are indeed given by V ∗
j , deﬁne in equation (3). The results in the
next three lemmas and two propositions are analogous to standard manipulations of ﬁrst order conditions, except
for the fact that V may not be diﬀerentiable.
Consider the problem of the planner of an island that receives U workers per period and that starts with workers
(T1,T 2,...,TJ−1,T J) where Ti is the number of workers with tenure i =1 ,2,...,J. Deﬁne E as the set of possible
workers tenure proﬁles, E =[ 0 ,U]
J−1 × R+. The planners value function V : E × Z solves














θ[Ti − Ei]+( θ − τ)[TJ − EJ]
+β
Z
V (E0,E 1,...,EJ−2,E J−1 + EJ,z0)Q(z,dz0)
¾
subject to
0 ≤ E0 ≤ U,
0 ≤ Ei ≤ Ti for i =1 ,2,...,J.
The ﬁxed point of H gives the stationary version of island planning problem deﬁn e di n3 7 .
Proposition 5 H maps concave functions into concave ones.
The proof of this Proposition is standard, so we omit it..
We use the following notation for subgradients. Let G : X → R a concave function. We use ∂G(x) to denote
its subgradient at x (if it is clear the value of x from the context we simply use ∂G ). In our case X ⊂ Rn, we use
∂Gxi (x) for i =1 ,2,...,n (and ∂Gxi when it is clear) to denote the projection of ∂G(x) into the subspace of the
x0
is. Abusing notation, we use Gxi (x) (and Gi when it is clear) to denote a generic element of ∂Gxi (x), so that
Gxi (x) ∈ ∂Gxi (x).
The next proposition gives a useful result, ordering the subgradients of V
Proposition 6 Consider a function V satisfying
VT1 ≥ VT2 ≥ ···≥ VTJ−1 ≥ VTJ, (12)
VT1 ≤ VTJ + τ (13)
for all z and T>0, where ¡




H [V ]T1 ≥ H [V ]T2 ≥ ···≥ H [V ]TJ−1 ≥ H [V ]TJ , (14)
H [V ]T1 ≤ H [V ]TJ + τ (15)
for all z and T>0, where
³
H [V ]T1 ,H[V ]T2 ,...,H[V ]TJ−1 ,H[V ]TJ
´
∈ ∂H[V ](T,z).
Intuitively it follows from the assumption that workers are perfect substitutes and from the fact that τ>0.
The following proposition and corollaries are important to characterize the solution of the problem and to reduce
its dimensionality.
Proposition 7 Let V satisfy (12). Then the policies for H [V ] satisfy the following. Let E =( E0,E 1,...,EJ−1,EJ) ∈
[0,U]
J ×R+ be feasible given T. Consider an alternative ˜ E =
³
˜ E0, ˜ E1,..., ˜ EJ−1, ˜ EJ
´







˜ Ej and EJ = ˜ EJ,
and iii) there is a j0 such that ˜ Ej ≥ Ej for all j ≤ j0 ≤ J − 1 and that ˜ Ej =0 for all j, j0 <j≤ J − 1. Then ˜ E is
weakly preferred to E.
iiProof. Replacing any policy by one with these properties can not decrease output but can decrease the separation
cost τ.
Corollary 8 The optimal policy can be chosen with the following property:
(*) If Ej <T j for some j, 1 ≤ j ≤ J − 1,t h e nEj0 =0for all j0 : j<j 0 ≤ J − 1.




J)=( E0,E 1,...,EJ−2,E J−1 + EJ)
then T0 ∈ E.
The next set of results establish that the ﬁxed point V = H [V ] is diﬀerentiable and that its derivatives are indeed
given by V ∗
j . The results in the next three lemmas and two propositions are analogous to standard manipulations of
ﬁrst order conditions, except for the fact that V may not be diﬀerentiable.
Let deﬁne the function ˆ R(E,z), as follows: ˆ R : R
J+1










Ei − (θ − τ)EJ
+β
Z
V (E0,E 1,...,E J−2,E J−1 + EJ,z0)Q(z,dz0).
The ﬁrst lemma shows a standard saddle-type result for the problem deﬁning H [V ].
Lemma 10 Let V be concave. Fix T,z and let
H [V ](T,z)=m a x
E
n
ˆ R(E,z)+ˆ θT :0≤ E ≤ T
o
, (16)
E (T,z) = argmax
E
n




ˆ θ + λ
∗ =( H [V ]0 ,H[V ]1 ,...,H [V ]J) ∈ ∂H[V ](T,z)
if and only if λ
∗ is a Lagrange multiplier, i.e.
ˆ R(E∗,z)+λ(T − E∗) ≥ ˆ R(E∗,z)+λ
∗ (T − E∗) (17)
≥ ˆ R(E,z)+λ
∗ (T − E)
for all non-negative E,λ,w h e r eˆ θ =( θ,...,θ,θ − τ),E ∗ = E (T,z) and U = T0.
Notice that since ˆ R is concave and the restrictions are linear, E (T,z) solves problem (16) if and only if there
(E∗,λ
∗) is a saddle as in equation (17) -see, for example, “Analytical Method in Economics”, Takayama, Theorem
2.9-.
The next lemma shows the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem.






ˆ R(E,z) s.t. 0 ≤ E ≤ T





∈ ∂ ˆ R(E∗,z) such that (E∗,λ
∗) is a saddle where,
λ
∗
i = ˆ R∗
i. (18)
Given our previous results we can now write the analogous to the Euler equations.
iiiProposition 12 Let V be concave. Fix T,z. Then, 0 ≤ E∗ ≤ T is an optimal choice given T,z if and only if for all
{H [V ]i (T,z)}
J





∈ ∂ ˆ R(E∗,z) such that
H [V ]i (T,z)= ˆ Ri (E∗,z)+θ for i =0 ,...,J− 1


















with = if E∗
i > 0
ˆ Ri (E∗,z) ≥ 0,
0=( H [V ]i (T,z) − θ)(Ti − E∗
i ),a n d
H [V ]J (T,z)= ˆ RJ (E∗,z)+θ − τ ,
0=( H [V ]J (T,z) − (θ − τ))(TJ − E∗
J),


















with = if E∗
J > 0
ˆ RJ (E∗,z) ≥ 0
w h e r ew el e tU = T0.
The next lemma shows that employment is bounded below, and hence marginal productivity is bounded above.
Lemma 13 There is an e>0 such that for all T,z
J X
i=0
Ei (T,z) ≥ e>0.
By this lemma, the solution for V ∗






Proposition 14 Let V be the ﬁxed point of H. Assume that U>0. Then V is diﬀerentiable with respect to Ti when
Ti > 0.
ivAppendix B: Analysis of the Simpliﬁed Island Planning Problem










0 ≤ et ≤ t,
0 ≤ ep ≤ p,
and where the law of motion is given by
t0 =m i n {U + et,JU}
p0 = ep +m a x{U + et − JU,0}
Proposition 15 Consider V and v such that
v(T1 + T2 + ... + TJ−1,T J,z)=V (T1,T 2,...,TJ−1,T J,z) (20)
for all (T1,T 2,...,TJ−1,T J) ∈ E. Then
h[v](T1 + T2 + ... + TJ−1,T J,z)=H [V ](T1,T 2,...,TJ−1,T J,z) (21)
for all (T1,T 2,...,TJ−1,T J) ∈ E.
Proof. By Proposition 7 and its corollaries, h[v]=H [V ] in E.
Lemma 16 Assume that V satisﬁes (12). Consider T and ˆ T and V such that
T1 + T2 + ... + TJ−1 = ˆ T1 + ˆ T2 + ... + ˆ TJ−1 and TJ = ˆ TJ. (22)
for any ˆ T ∈ E and T ∈ E then





Proof. If follows directly from the deﬁnition of E and the assumed property (12).
Proposition 17 Let v be the function corresponding to V as in (20) deﬁned for T ∈ E. Assume that V (·,z) is
concave, and that V satisﬁes (12). Then h[v](·,z) is concave in t,p.
Remark 18 The previous proposition is not obvious since the feasible set of the problem deﬁned by the right hand
side of h[v] is not convex.
We now introduced the R, which is the objective function being maximized in h[v]. The "derivatives’ of R are
used to deﬁne the functions ˆ t and ˆ p.
Deﬁnition 19 Given v, deﬁne R(et,e p,z) as
R(et,e p,z)=F (et + ep,z) − θet − (θ − τ)ep
+β
Z
v(U +m i n{et,(J − 1)U},e t + ep − min{et,(J − 1)U},z0)Q(z,dz0)
vConsider an island planner with no temporary workers ( t =0 )a n dag i v e nz. The quantity ˆ p(z) is the number of
permanent workers that leaves the island’s planner indiﬀerent between ﬁring “one" permanent worker and keeping
all ˆ p(z) of them.
Deﬁnition 20 Let R be deﬁned as in (19). For each z deﬁne ˆ p(z), such that
0 ∈ ∂Rep (0, ˆ p(z),z) .
Consider an island planner with 0 <p<ˆ p(z), so it does it not want to ﬁre any permanent worker for that z. The
quantity ˆ t(p,z) is the number of temporary workers that leaves the island’s planner indiﬀerent between ﬁring “one"
transitory worker and keeping all ˆ t(p,z) of them. Formally:
Deﬁnition 21 Let R be deﬁned as in (19). For each p,z deﬁne ˆ t(p,z) as follows:
(i) if Ret > 0 for all Ret ∈ ∂Ret (U · J,p,z),t h e nˆ t(p,z)=J · U,
(ii) if Ret < 0 for all Ret ∈ ∂Ret (0,p,z), then ˆ t(p,z)=0 ,





The remaining of this section shows that ˆ p,ˆ t exists, that they are unique, and that ˆ t is decreasing in p. The proofs
are complicated by the fact that R is not diﬀerentiable.
Proposition 22 Let v be functions corresponding to V as in (20), assume that V is concave and satisﬁes (12). The
function R(·,z) is strictly concave.
Deﬁne M :[ 0 ,U· J] → R+ as
M(et) ≡ min{et,(J − 1)U}
notice that
ep +m a x{et − (J − 1)U,0}
= ep + et − min{et,(J − 1)U}
= ep + et − M (et).
Remark 23 It is standard to show that h[v] is increasing in t, p and z if v has that properties.
Remark 24 Assume that V satisﬁes (12) and (13). Let v be deﬁned as in (20). Denote by ∂h[v] the subgradient
of h[v](t,p,z) when v is considered as a function of t and p. A corollary of Proposition (15) and Proposition (6) is
that











∂h[v](t,p,z).T h e nh[v]p ≥ θ − τ. Moreover, there exists a ¯ p(z) such that for all p ≥ ¯ p(z) and t: h[v]p = θ − τ for




v(U + M (et),e t + ep − M (et),z0)Q(z,dz0)
as a function of et and ep and z. Let ∂B be its subgradient with respect to (et,e p).
viLemma 26 Assume that v is concave and that it satisﬁes
vp ≤ vt ≤ vp + τ,




∈ ∂b(et,e p,z). Then
bep ≤ bet ≤ bep + τ.
Let ∂R(et,e p,z) be the subgradient of R when considered as a function of (et,e p).
Lemma 27 Assume that v is concave and that is satisﬁes
vp ≤ vt ≤ vp + τ,





Rep ≥ Ret + τ (1 − β).
Corollary 28 Let ep,e t be the optimal choice of employment for Problem (19). If ep <pand t>0, then et =0 . If
this were not true, i.e. if ep <pand et > 0,t h e nRep = Ret =0 , which contradicts Lemma 27.
Lemma 29 Let v be functions corresponding to V as in (20), assume that V is concave and satisﬁes (12). Let R be
deﬁned as in (19).
For each z there is a unique ˆ p satisfying (20). Moreover, 0 < ˆ p(z) < ¯ p(z) < +∞.
Using the concavity of R and strict concavity of F we deﬁne ˆ t as follows.
Lemma 30 Let v be functions corresponding to V as in (20), assume that V is concave and satisﬁes (12). Let R be
deﬁned as in (19).
Then for each (p,z), 0 <p<ˆ p(z), there exists a unique ˆ t that satisﬁes (21).
Proof. The existence and uniqueness of ˆ t in follows from the strict concavity of R.
Proposition 31 Assume that V is concave and that satisﬁes (13) and (12). Let v be given by V as in (20). Assume,
without loss of generality that v is concave in (t,p).T h e n ,
i) The optimal decision rules of h[v] are described by the set of Inaction for R as





ep (t,p,z)=m i n {p, ˆ p(z)}
for all t,p,z.
ii) H [V ] is concave, satisﬁes (13) and (12).
iii) h[v] and H [V ] satisfy (20) and h[v] is concave.
Proof. It follows from the deﬁnition of ˆ t, ˆ p and various of the previous results.
Lemma 32 Let V be concave, and satisfy (12) and (13). Let v be deﬁned as in (20). Let ˆ t, ˆ p and I be deﬁned as
in (29), (??), (5). Then, the subgradients of h[v] are as follows:
If t 6= iU for i =1 ,2,..,J − 1, then h[v](t,p,z) is diﬀerentiable with respect to t.
If (t,p) ∈ Int(I (z)) :
h[v]t (t,p,z)=f (t + p,z)+β
Z
bet (t,p,z0)Q(z,dz0) >θ ,






h[v]t (t,p,z)=θ>f(t + p,z)+β
Z
bet (t,p,z0)Q(z,dz0),
If (t,p): t = ˆ t(p,z) <JU:
£




θ, f (t + p,z)+β¯ bet (t,p,z)
¤
viiDeﬁnition 33 We say that ∂vt (t,p,z) is decreasing in p if it satisﬁes the following property. If p<p 0, then deﬁne
v0
t, ¯ v0












t ≤ vt and ¯ v0
t ≤ ¯ vt
Notice that if v is diﬀerentiable at (t,p,z) this property simply says that ∂v(t,p,z)/∂t is decreasing in p.
Lemma 34 .L e tV be concave, and satisfy (12), and (13). Let v be deﬁned as in (20). Assume that the subgradient
of vt is decreasing in p, i.e. it satisﬁes the condition 33. Let ˆ t(p,z) be deﬁned as in (??) for the optimal rule that
attains the right hand side of h[v]. Then, the subgradient of h[v]t is decreasing in p too, i.e. it satisﬁes the condition
33 and ˆ t(p,z) is weakly decreasing in p.
Finally
Proposition 35 Let v be the ﬁxed point of h. Let ˆ t be deﬁned as in deﬁnition ??.T h e nˆ t(p,z) is decreasing in p.
Moreover, if ˆ t is not a multiple of U, then ˆ t is strictly decreasing in t.
viiiAppendix C: Proofs
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 . To show this proposition we characterize the competitive equilibrium of a particular
decentralization of the economy. Since the 1st welfare theorem holds, characterizing this equilibrium gives us a
characterization of the eﬃcient allocations. We call this equilibrium "auxiliary competitive equilibrium" or "ACE"
for short. See Appendix D below for a deﬁnition of the ACE. The characterization of a stationary ACE coincides
with conditions i) to vi) of Theorem 1.
We start by providing some of the necessary conditions that an ACE must satisfy.
Lemma 36 Let {θt,λ t (zt,X),E j,t (zt,X),T j,t (zt,X),S j,t (zt,X),U t,L t; all t,zt,j,X} be an AC equilibrium.
Then, there is sequence {σt} where σt is the value of search at t, for which:














θt =m a x {ω + βθt+1,σt}
0=Lt [θt − ω − βθt+1]
and























The proof of this Lemma follows directly from the linearity in the problem of ﬁrms of type II.
This Lemma shows, among other things, that the value to a ﬁrm of type I of reallocation (ﬁring) a worker does
not depend on the characteristic of the island, so that θt does not depend on (zt,X) and that the value of search
σt is related to the value of "selling" (assigning) a worker to the diﬀerent islands randomly, i.e. in proportion to the
number of island of each type.
We will show that the ACE allocation can be obtained by solving a particular dynamic programing problem given
two numbers (θ,U) and by checking two appropriate equilibrium conditions. We develop this characterization in a
sequence of results.
The solution of the dynamic programing problem will give the equilibrium quantities chosen by ﬁrms of type I
and the equilibrium prices λt (zt,X). This problem has the interpretation of the maximization problem solved for
a coalition of ﬁr m so ft y p eIt h a ta r ee n d o w e dw i t haﬂow U ={Ut}
∞
t=0 of newly arrived workers. We refer to this
problem as the "island planner problem", i.e. the problem of a planner in charge of the island employment decision
by tenure. The planner chooses how many workers of each tenure to employ and how many to send back, obtaining
θt f o re a c ho ft h e m ,n e to ft h ec o s tτ.
Deﬁnition 37 Let Vt : RJ




















Vt+1 (E0,...,EJ−1 + EJ;zt+1,U) }Q(zt+1|zt) }
subject to
T0 = Ut
Ej ≤ Tj j =0 ,1,...,J.
where U = {Ut; all t ≥ 0} ∈ R∞
+ .















be an auxiliary com-
petitive equilibrium given initial conditions U∗
−1,η∗ (X|z0).D e ﬁne ˆ Vt for {U∗
t ,θ
∗















































with respect to U∗
t .
The proof of this Lemma follows from comparing the island planning problem with the problem of ﬁrms of type
I in a competitive equilibrium, and from the deﬁnition of a subgradient.
The next Lemma gives the characterization of ACE.
Lemma 39 . Let some arbitrary initial distribution η∗ (X|z0) be given. Let also some arbitrary sequence {U∗
t ,θ
∗
t : all t} be







































































































































η∗ (X|z0) ≥ 0 for all t.
iv) Suppose that the following optimal labor force participation conditions are satisﬁed
θ
∗








t [θt − ω + βθt+1]=0













is a auxiliary competitive
equilibrium given the initial conditions U∗
−1 and η∗.
The proof of this Lemma follows by construction and by the deﬁnition of competitive equilibrium and the
properties of Problem (37).
Since the ﬁrst welfare theorem hold for this economy, the characterization of the allocation for an ACE in the
previous Lemma applies to the eﬃcient allocations.
Now we deﬁne stationary ACE in terms of the objects used our previous characterization of the ACE.
xDeﬁnition 40 We say that the auxiliary competitive equilibrium {θt,λ t,L t,U t,E jt,S jt} for initial measure η is a
stationary equilibrium if there are constants, θ,U,L, and functions, E∗
j : R
J+1





θt = θ, all t
Ut = U, all t




























and where deﬁning T0
j : R
J+1










and letting µ be an invariant distribution of the joint process (T,z), with transition given by (T0,Q),w eh a v e
η(T|z)ζ (z)=µ(T,z)
where ζ (z) is the invariant distribution of z.
Finally, since a stationary ACE is a particular type of ACE, then by the previous application of the 1st welfare
theorem, the stationary version of conditions i) to iv) in Lemma 39 characterizes a stationary eﬃcient allocation.
Since the stationary version of conditions i) to iv) in Lemma 39 coincide with conditions i) to iv) of this Theorem,
we have ﬁnished its the proof.
Proof. of Proposition 6 We ﬁrst show that (15). Consider two states T>0 and T0 > 0, where T0 is obtained
from T by increasing the number of workers with tenure J by δ and by decreasing decreasing the number of workers
with tenure 1 by δ:
T0
j = Tj for j =2 ,...,J − 1
T0
1 = T1 − δ and T0
J = TJ + δ
It suﬃces to show that there is a feasible policy for T0 that produces a reduction in total payoﬀ at most by τ and
thus
H [V (T0,z)] − H [V (T,z)] ≥− τ.
To establish this consider two cases, depending on whether in the original \plan more than δ workers with tenure 1
were ﬁred or not. Let δ be a positive number smaller than T1/2. I nt h ec a s ew h e r em o r et h a nδ workers with tenure
1 were ﬁred, then reduce the ﬁring of workers with tenure 1 by δ and increase the ﬁring of workers with tenure J by
δ. Then there is a reduction in current payoﬀ of τ, and no change in the future state. In the second case, let
1
δ















βE[V (E0,...,EJ−2,E J−1 + EJ,z0)|z]
where
˜ Ej = Ej for j =2 ,...,J − 1
˜ E1 = E1 − δ
˜ EJ = EJ + δ








˜ E0,..., ˜ EJ−2, ˜ EJ−1 + ˜ EJ,z0
´
− V (E0,...,EJ−2,E J−1 + EJ,z0)
=m i n
(V1,...,VJ)∈∂V
{(VJ − V1)(E0,...,EJ−2,E J−1 + EJ,z0)}
= −τ +m i n
(V1,...,VJ)∈∂V
{(VJ − V1)(E0,...,EJ−2,E J−1 + EJ,z0)+τ}





(VJ − V1)(E0 + ε,...,EJ−2 + ε,EJ−1 + EJ + ε,z0)+τ
¾




{(VJ − V1)(E0 + ε,...,EJ−2 + ε,EJ−1 + EJ + ε,z0)+τ}
≥− τ
where we use theorem 24.4, page 233, of Rockafellar (1997) which shows that the graph of ∂f is closed for a concave
function on Rn., the hypothesis that (13) holds for all subgradients with T>0,a n dw h e r ew ed e n o t e
(VJ − V1)(E0,...,EJ−2,E J−1 + EJ,z0)
≡ VJ (E0,...,EJ−2,E J−1 + EJ,z0)+τ − V1 (E0,...,EJ−2,E J−1 + EJ,z0).
Finally since for all subgradients:




(H [V (T0,z)] − H [V (T,z)])
then
H [V ]J (T,z) − H [V ]1 (T,z) ≥− τ.
The argument to show that (14) follows from a similar argument, where we let
T 0
j = Tj + δ and T0
j+1 = Tj+1 − δ
for j =1 ,...,J − 1.
Proof of Lemma 10.L e tλ
∗ be a Lagrange multiplier, then λ
∗ (T − E∗)=0 . Consider T0,a n dE0 = E (T0,z),
then
H [V ](T,z) − ˆ θT
= ˆ R(E (T),z)
≥ ˆ R(E (T0),z)+λ
∗ (E (T) − E (T0))
≥ ˆ R(E (T0),z)+λ
∗ (T − T0)
= H [V ](T0,z) − ˆ θT0 + λ
∗ (T − T0)
thus ˆ θ + λ
∗ is a subgradient of H [V ]. Let ˆ θ + λ
∗ be a subgradient of H [V ](T,z). Since workers can always be sent
back and get ˆ θ,t h e nλ
∗ ≥ 0. Also,
H [V ](T,z)=H [V ](E∗,z)+ˆ θ[T − E∗]
for E∗ = E (T,z). Then, by deﬁnition of subgradient
ˆ θ[T − E∗]=H [V ](T,z) − H [V ](E∗,z) ≥
³





0= ˆ R(T,z) − ˆ R(E∗,z) ≥ λ
∗ (T − E∗)
but E∗ ≤ T so λ
∗ (T − E∗)=0 . This equality, together with the deﬁnition of a subgradient imply that λ
∗ is a
Lagrange multiplier.
xiiProof of 11. Let (E∗,λ
∗) be a saddle satisfying (18). Then, by theorem 2.9 in Takayama E∗ is optimal. Let
E∗ be optimal. Then, by theorem 2.9 in Takayama there are λ
∗ ≥ 0 such that (E∗,λ
∗) i sas a d d l e .I tr e s t st os h o w
that λ
∗
i = ˆ R∗
i for some subgradient. From the deﬁnition of a saddle,
ˆ R(E∗,z)+λ
∗ (T − E∗) ≥ ˆ R(E,z)+λ
∗ (T − E)
or
ˆ R(E∗,z) ≥ ˆ R(E,z)+λ
∗ (E∗ − E).
which is the deﬁnition of a subgradient.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 2 .Let E∗ be optimal. Take any {H [V ]i (T,z)}
J
i=0 ∈ ∂H[V ](T,z). By lemma 10 λ
∗ is
a Lagrange multiplier, where
{H [V ]i (T,z)}
J
i=0 = λ
∗ + ˆ θ.
By lemma 18, λ
∗
i = ˆ R∗
i for some subgradient. Then ˆ Ri ≥ 0, and
0= ˆ R∗
i (Ti − E∗
i )=( H [V ]i (T,z) − θ)(Ti − E∗
i ).
Let {H [V ]i (T,z)}
J
i=0 ∈ ∂H[V ](T,z),a n dl e tR∗
i be a subgradient of ˆ R∗ evaluated at some 0 ≤ E∗ ≤ T such
that the above conditions are satisﬁed. Deﬁne λ
∗ as
λ
∗ = {H [V ]i (T,z)}
J




where the last equality follow by the assumed properties. We will show that (E∗,λ




i (Ti − E∗
i )
Hence,
ˆ R(E∗,z)+λ(T − E∗) ≥ ˆ R(E∗,z)+λ
∗ (T − E∗),f o re v e r yλ ≥ 0
Since, by the above conditions, λ
∗ is a subgradient of ˆ R∗ evaluated at 0 ≤ E∗ ≤ T, it follows that
ˆ R(E,z) ≤ ˆ R(E∗,z)+λ
∗ (E − E∗), for every E
Hence,
ˆ R(E∗,z)+λ
∗ (T − E∗) ≥ ˆ R(E,z)+λ
∗ (T − E), for every E





















follows since ∂ (g + h)(x)=∂g(x)+∂h(x), see Rockafeller, Thm 23.8 and since F is diﬀerentiable with derivative
f.W h e nE∗
i =0 , the subgradient of F are any numbers greater than f, and hence the previous expression hold with
inequality.
Proof of Lemma 13. By contradiction , for all e>0, there is a T,z such that
J X
i=0
Ei (T,z) ≤ e,
Take e<Uand such that
f (e,z) >θ .
where z = min{z : z ∈ Z}. Since T0 = U>0,E 0 (T,z) <T 0.From 12
0=[ H [V ]0 (T,z) − θ][T0 − E0]
xiiithus
H [V ]0 (T,z)=θ
but
H [V ]0 (T,z)= ˆ R0 (E∗,z)+θ
so ˆ R0 (E∗,z)=0 . Since


































is optimal. Take a subgradient
Vi (T,z)=H [V ]i (T,z).
First consider the case where E∗
i,s =0 , then






thus, its unique solution is H [V ]i (T,z)=θi (s), provided that Ti,s > 0. Thus, as an special case, if E∗
i,0 =0 , then
θi (0) is the derivative of V.
Now consider the case where E∗
i,s > 0. We use the formulae in Proposition 12 and replace its value repeatedly,
solving it forward until ˆ τj = s, the ﬁrst time that for this cohort employment is smaller than the number of workers
present at the location. Since E∗
i,s > 0 at each iteration

















Notice that in this case, we argue above that Vi = θi (s). Thus, we ﬁnd that unique solution of H [V ]i (T,z) is
V ∗
i (T,z). Hence the subgradient is unique, and thus V (T,z) is diﬀerentiable.
Proof. of Proposition 17. Take (t1,p 1) and (t2,p 2) and consider (tλ,p λ)= ( λt1 +( 1− λ)t2,λ p 1 +( 1− λ)p2).
Let the unique corresponding elements in E for (t1,p 1) and (t2,p 2) be T1 and T2. Consider Tλ = λT1 +( 1− λ)T2,




ˆ Tλ and pλ = ˆ TJ.
Then,
λh[v](t1,p 1,z)+( 1− λ)h[v](t2,p 2,z)
= λH [V ](T1,z)+( 1− λ)H [V ](T2,z)
≤ H [V ](Tλ,z)





where the ﬁrst equality follows from Proposition 15, the ﬁrst inequality follows from concavity of V and Proposition
5 , the second inequality follows from Lemma 16, and the last equality follows from Proposition 15.











Ej − (θ − τ)EJ
+β
Z
V (U,E0,...,E J−2,E J−1 + EJ,z0)Q(z,dz0).















t +( 1− λ)e2
t,λe 1
p +( 1− λ







J × R+ that satisﬁes property (*) be denoted by ˜ Ei for





t and EJ = eλ
p.
Deﬁne ˜ Eλ a st h eu n i q u ee l e m e n ti n[0,U]













































where the ﬁrst equality follows construction of ˜ Ei and since by assumption v and V satisﬁes (20), the ﬁrst inequality
follows from the concavity of ˆ R, the second inequality follows by assumption (12) and Proposition 7 and its corollaries,
and the last equality follows from the same argument than in Proposition 15.
Proof. of Proposition 25 Deﬁne the operator ¯ h as
¯ h[v](t,p,z)= m a x
0≤et,0≤ep
{F (et + ep,z)+θ[t − et]+( θ − τ)[p − ep]+
+β
Z
v(U + M (et),e p + et − M (et),z0)Q(z,dz0)
¾
Comparing this problem with (??) the constraints et ≤ t and ep ≤ p were removed, hence
h[v](t,p,z) ≤ ¯ h[v](t,p,z).
The optimal policies et,e p do not depend on t and p, thus the function ¯ h[v] is linear with derivatives
¯ h[v]p (t,p,z)=θ − τ
¯ h[v]t (t,p,z)=θ
for all t,p,z. By concavity of h[v],
h[v](t,0,z) ≤ h[v](t,p,z)+h[v]p (0 − p) or





∈ ∂h[v](t,p,z). Rearranging and using the linearity of ¯ h[v]:
h[v]p p + h[v](t,0,z) ≤ h[v](t,p,z) ≤ ¯ h[v](t,p,z)=¯ h[v](t,0,z)+[ θ − τ]p
xvfor all p. Thus by monotonicity of h[v] and ¯ h[v] on t :
h[v]p (t,p,z)p + h[v](0,0,z) ≤ ¯ h[v]((J − 1)U,0,z)+[ θ − τ]p
sup
t∈[0,U(J−1)]




h[v](0,0,z) − ¯ h[v](U (J − 1),0,z)
p
=0 ≤ lim inf
p→∞
Ã












≤ θ − τ.
On the other hand, for the original problem (??)f o r(p0,t,z). A feasible policy for p ≥ p0 is to set e0
p = ep (p0,t,z),
in which case each additional unit of p yields θ − τ. Hence the right derivative of h[v](t,p0,z) is greater or equal
than θ − τ.Since h[v] is concave, then h[v]p (t,p0,z) ≥ θ − τ for all (t,p0,z).
Combining the two inequalities, for large enough p, h[v]p (p,t,z)=θ − τ for all t.
Proof. of Lemma 26. Consider two cases. First et < (J − 1)U.I nt h i sc a s eM (et)=et, which implies that
b(et,e p,z)=
Z









(vt,v p) ∈ ∂v(U + et,e p,z0)
for the corresponding elements. Second, if et > (J − 1)U,
b(et,e p,z)=
Z









vp ≤ vt ≤ vp + τ,
we have shown the required result, except for the case where et =( J − 1)U. This case follows by continuity, since
the graph of the subgradient of a concave function is closed (Rockafellar, 1997, Theorem 24.4, page 233).
Proof. of Lemma 27. By the deﬁnition of R :
Rep = f (et,e p,z) − (θ − τ)+βbep,










≥ τ (1 − β)
where the inequality follows from the previous lemma.
Proof. of Lemma 29. The existence of ˆ p follows by the concavity of R with respect to p, the Inada conditions
on F and from Proposition 25, which shows that vp = θ − τ for large p. The uniqueness of p follows by the strict
concavity of F.T h a tˆ p<¯ p follows from concavity of R with respect of ep and Lemma 27.
Proof. of Lemma 32. The ﬁrst statement follows by considering the case where T ∈ E so that there is a
i ∈ {1,2,...,J − 1} and Ti such that
T1,...,TJ =( U,..,U,Ti,0,...,0,T J)
for Ti ∈ (0,U)
V (U,...,U,Ti,...,0,T J)=v((i − 1)U + Ti,T J) for all Ti ∈ (0,U)
Thus
Vi (U,...,U,Ti,...,0,T J)=vt ((i − 1)U + Ti,T J) for i =1 ,2,...,J − 1.
The second and third claims follows from the form of the optimal decision rules, i.e. the deﬁnition of the range of
inaction and the strict concavity of R. The third follows since, for t ≥ ˆ t(p,z) it is feasible to ﬁre any extra temporary
workers, so that we know the right derivative of h[v] with respect to t.
Proof. of Lemma 34. First we establish that ˆ t(p,z) is decreasing in p. Then we use this result, to show that
h[v]t is decreasing in p.





for the case when 0 < ˆ t<J U .The main idea is to show that Ret (t,p,z) is decreasing in p, a n dt h e nu s et h a t ,b y
concavity, Ret (t,p,z) is decreasing in t.
The subgradient Ret is given by
Ret (t,p,z)=f (t + p,z) − θ + βbet (t,p,z)
where b(t,p,z) is given by
b(t,p,z)=
Z
v(U +m i n{t,U (J − 1)},t+ p − min{t,U (J − 1)},z0)Q(z,dz0)
W ec a nt h e nw r i t eb by cases as
b(t,p,z)=
Z
v(U + t,p,z0)Q(z,dz0) if t ≤ U (J − 1)
b(t,p,z)=
Z
v(UJ,t+ p − U (J − 1),z0)Q(z,dz0) for t ≥ U (J − 1)
and hence its subgradients are
bet (t,p,z)=
Z







if t = U(J − 1)
bet (t,p,z)=
Z
vp (UJ,t+ p − U (J − 1),z0)Q(z,dz0) for t>U(J − 1)
Now we are ready to show that Ret (t,p,z) is strictly decreasing in p. Consider ﬁrst the case where t<U(J − 1). In
this case it follows from the hypothesis that vt is decreasing in p and the strict concavity of f. Consider the case
where t>(J − 1)U. In this case it follows from the concavity of v, so that vp is decreasing, and the strict concavity of
f. Finally, for the case where t =( J − 1)U, we combine the previous two arguments for the right and left derivatives.
Having established that Ret (t,p,z) is strictly decreasing in p, then it follows that ˆ t is decreasing in p since Ret is
decreasing in t by concavity of R.
xviiThe cases where ˆ t = UJ or ˆ t =0are similar.
Now we turn to show that h[v]t is decreasing in p. We consider three cases. First, let (t,p) ∈ Int(I (z)). In this
case,
h[v]t (t,p,z)=f (t + p,z)+βbet (t,p,z)
= Ret (t,p,z)+θ





, then h[v]t = θ, and hence h[v] is diﬀerentiable, and its derivative constant, so that it is weakly
decreasing in p. Finally, consider the case where (t,p,z) is such that t = ˆ t(p,z). As shown above ˆ t is weakly
decreasing in p,t h u sf o rp0 >p ,t≥ ˆ t(p0,z). Also, the derivative subgradient of h[v]t are
£




θ, f (t + p,z)+β¯ bet (t,p,z)
¤
If ˆ t(p0,z)=ˆ t(p,z), then, using the expression for the left derivative of h[v]t , it follows since f is concave and since,









= θ. Thus h[v]t has decreased in
this case too, since the subgradient has collapsed to its right derivative.
Proof. of Proposition 35. That ˆ t is decreasing in t follows using Lemma 34. Notice that starting with
V 0 =0and v0 =0satisﬁes all the hypothesis of this lemma. Since all these properties are preserved in the
limit, they hold for the ﬁxed point. That see that ˆ t is strictly consider ﬁrst the case where t<U(J − 1). In this
case if follows by using that in a neighborhood of those points v(t + U,p,z0) is diﬀerentiable with respect to t -see











that vt (t + U,p,z0) is decreasing in p, and that f is strictly decreasing. A similar argument holds when t>









JU,p+ ˆ t(p,z) − JU,z0¢
Q(z,dz0).
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3a n dP r o p o s i t i o n4 .
To prove the theorem it is convenient to deﬁne a sequential economy that corresponds to the island planning
problem taking as given U,θ.. This economy has a ﬁrm whose problem corresponds to that one of the ﬁrm with
value function B in the RCE and a family whose problem has solution that gives the workers value function W in
the RCE.
I) We deﬁne this economy in a standard Arrow-Debreu sequential way. This deﬁnition allows to use the 1st and
2nd welfare theorem to link the allocation that solves the island sequence planning problem with an allocation that
solves the ﬁrms and workers problem in the island economy as well as to link it with the equilibrium wages w.
The commodities for the sequential island economy with initial state X,z0 is given by processes for employment









: j =0 ,...,J, zt ∈ Z
ª
.
We use gjt to denote the labor choice of the ﬁrms in a sequential island problem. We use the ht and st for hiring
















The choices of g for the ﬁrms are subject to the restrictions that gj,−1 (z−1)=Xj for j =0 ,...,J, the law of motion




























for all j =0 ,...,J, zt,t≥ 0.
We use e to denote the labor choice and c for the consumption choice of the household in the sequential island
problem. This household “owns" as an endowment a stream of U unemployed workers per period, that arrive to the
island every period. The household is risk neutral in terms of consumption ct (zt). Its decision is to assign a worker
to work on the island or to permanently work outside the island, which gives value θ per worker, in units of the ﬁnal











































The household is subject to the following restrictions:
ej,−1 (z−1)=Xj for j =0 ,...,J











































for all j =0 ,....,J, and all t, zt. Prices in this sequence island economy are given by intertemporal consumption prices,
Pt (X,zt) and wages by tenure wjt(X,zt) in terms of date t history zt consumption goods. Given the household













































and the law of motion for s,h and g. Let β
tξt (zt)Q(zt|z0) be the multiplier of the restriction (24). The ﬁrst order





























































with equality if ht (zt) > 0. The ﬁrst order conditions for st (zt) is































Now we turn to the household problem in a sequential island economy. Letting β
tQ(zt|z0)ˆ νj,t (zt) be the Lagrange















































































for j =0 ,...,J − 1 and analogously for j = J.






















































































































with = if eJt(zt) > 0.
The slackness conditions are: if ejt(zt) <e j−1t−1
¡
zt−1¢







then ˆ νJt(zt)=0 .
To compare a competitive equilibrium with the planning problems it helps deﬁne a sequential island planning
problem. In this problem the planner maximizes the expected discounted value of net output (23) subject to the
feasibility constraints (24) and (25). This is the sequential version of the recursive island planning problem. Let
V0 (X,z0) be the value attained by this planning problem.
Let β
tξt (zt)Q(zt|z0) be the multiplier of the constraint (24) and β
tνjt(zt)Q(zt|z0) the multiplier of the con-















































































































































































if EJt(zt) > 0.
To see why this is the case, write the Lagrangian for the planning problem is:















































































































































































with equality if EJt(zt) > 0.










with equality if St (zt) > 0.
(II) We now show i), the 1st welfare theorem, and iii). We start with an island RCE {w,W,B,G}. Pick an
arbitrary state (T,z)=( X,z0) in the support of µ. We construct the sequential CE with (X,z0) as initial condition


























































It is immediate to verify that {e, ˆ ν} solves the f.o.c. of the household problem in a sequential island equilibrium, and
hence it solves the household problem. For future reference we deﬁne
Wj0 (X,z0)=ˆ νj0 (z0,X)+θ.




























solves the ﬁrms order conditions of the ﬁr m ’ sp r o b l e mi na ni s l a n ds e q u e n t i a l
CE, and hence it solves the ﬁrm’s problem. Let B0 be the value of the ﬁrm in the sequential island CE. For future
reference, from the envelope theorem, we have
∂B0 (xJ,X,z 0)/∂xJ = ˆ ξ0 (X,z0)
evaluated at xJ = XJ.
By the 1st welfare thm. applied to the sequential island economy, {e} = {g} is a P.O. allocation, and hence
solves the sequential island planning problem. By inspection, the Lagrange multipliers {ξt,νjt} that satisfy the ﬁrst
order conditions of the sequential planning problem are identical to the Lagrange multipliers for the ﬁrm’s problem n
ˆ ξt
o
and to the Lagrange multipliers {ˆ νjt} of the households problem in the sequential CE. From these ﬁrst order
conditions:
W∗
j0 (X,z0)=ˆ νj0 (z0,X)+θ = νj0 (z0,X)+θ = ∂V0 (X,z0)/∂Xj
for j =0 ,...,J − 1 and
WJ0 (X,z0)+∂B0 (xJ,X,z 0)/∂xJ =ˆ νJ0 (X,z0)+θ + ˆ ξ0 (X,z0)
= νJ0 (X,z0)+θ + ξ0 (X,z0)=∂V0 (X,z0)/∂XJ
evaluated at xJ = XJ. The allocation described by G is, by hypothesis, recursive, so it solves the recursive island





for all (T,z.) H e n c ew eh a v es h o w nt h eﬁrst welfare theorem for the recursive representation of the island problem,
and that (6), condition iii) of the theorem, holds.
(III). We now show ii), the 2nd welfare theorem, condition iii) of Theorem 3 and condition (b) of Proposition




= θ + νj (T,z).
for j =0 ,...,J − 1 and
∂V (T,z)
∂TJ
= θ + νJ (T,z)+ξ (T,z)
If if were the case that there are more than one pair νJ,ξ for a given T,z, utilize a selection that only depends on
(T,z). >From the principle of optimality, the solution of the recursive island problem V is the same as the value
function for the sequential island problem V0, so that V (T,z)=V0 (T,z).




























where Dt−1 is deﬁned as in (27) using the optimal decision rule from the recursive planning problem. By comparing
the ﬁrst order conditions of the recursive island planing problem with the ﬁrst order conditions of the sequential
xxiiiisland planning problem, it can be seen that {Et,νjt,ξt} so deﬁned solve the f.o.c. of the sequence island’s planning































































The function B0 (xJ,X,z 0) is deﬁned as the solution of the ﬁrm problem for wages wjt in the sequential island








for j =0 ,...,J.
Deﬁne the candidate multipliers for the sequential ﬁrm problem as ˆ ξt = ξt. Given wages wjt, and multipliers ˆ ξt, it
is easy to verify that the allocation gjt = Ejt, and its implied {st,h t} solve the ﬁrst order conditions of the ﬁrms in
the island sequential economy. To verify this, one uses the ﬁrst order conditions for the island planner problem in
the island sequential economy. >From the envelope condition it is immediate that
∂B0 (xJ,X,z 0)/∂xJ = ˆ ξ0 (X,z0)
where xJ = XJ.
Deﬁne the candidate multipliers for the sequential household problem ˆ vjt = vjt.Given wages wjt and multipliers
ˆ vjt it is easy to verify that the allocation ejt = Ejt solve the ﬁrst order conditions of the household problem in the
island sequential economy. To verify this, one uses the ﬁrst order conditions for the island planner problem in the
island sequential economy.
Thus we have established that the sequential allocation constructed out of the solution of the recursive island
planning problem from an initial state X,z0 can be decentralized as a sequential island competitive equilibrium.
Finally, we deﬁne the elements of the recursive competitive island equilibrium as follows:
wj (X,z0)=wj0 (X,z0),
Wj (X,z0)=Wj0 (X,z0),
B (XJ,X,z 0)=B0 (XJ,X,z 0)
By repeating this construction for all (X,z0) in the support of µ, we construct the functions w,W and B. These
functions constitute a RCE since they are constructed from the sequential island competitive equilibrium.
>From the previous arguments we have:
∂V (T,z)
∂Tj
= θ + νj (T,z)=θ + vj0 (z,T) (32)
= θ +ˆ νj0 (z,T)=Wj0 (T,z).
for j =0 ,...,J − 1 and
∂V (T,z)
∂TJ
= θ + νJ (T,z)+ξ (T,z)=θ + νJ0 (,z)+ξ0 (z,T) (33)




and thus condition iii) is satisﬁed.
xxiv(IV) We establish conditions (b) of Proposition 4. Since in (II) and (III) we have shown the 1st and 2nd welfare
theorems, we can, without loss of generality, start with an eﬃcient allocation and examine the equilibrium wages
w that we constructed in (III) in equations (28), (29) and (30). The multiplier ξ ∈ [−τ,0] and ξt (X,zt)=−τ if
St (zt) > 0, i.e. if permanent workers are being ﬁred. Thus, the inequalities in (b) follows from these deﬁnitions and
the properties of ξ.
(V). We establish condition c) of Proposition 4. Since in (II) and (III) we have shown the 1st and 2nd welfare
theorems, we can, without loss of generality, start with an eﬃcient allocation and examine the equilibrium value
function for workers W that we constructed in (III) in equation (31). Using equations (32), (33) we have that
∂V (T,z)
∂Tj
= Wj (T,z), for j =0 ,...,J − 1
∂V (T,z)
∂TJ
= WJ (T,z)+ξ (T,z) .
In Proposition (6) we have shown that
VT1 ≥ VT2 ≥ ···≥ VTJ−1,
Thus
W1 ≥ W2 ≥ ···≥ WJ−1.
Finally since W are part of an equilibrium, they satisfy
WJ−1 (T,z)=wJ−1 (T,z)+βE[WJ (A(T,z),z0)|z]
WJ (T,z)=wJ (T,z)+βE[WJ (A(T,z),z0)|z]
and since we have already established (c), wJ ≥ wJ−1, and thus we have WJ−1 ≤ WJ. This ﬁnishes the proof of IV).
xxvAppendix D: Deﬁnition of Auxiliary Competitive Equilibrium ("ACE").
This appendix deﬁnes the competitive equilibrium (ACE) used in the proof of Theorem 1. There are two types
of ﬁrms, type I and II, and families. The are as many markets to "buy" and "sell" workers as islands of type zt,X.
Preferences of the family.
The families own all ﬁrms of both type and consume ﬁnal consumption goods. They are risk neutral, and discount











Notice that ﬁrms do not "own" they all labor. The "labor" is allocated initially to the two types of ﬁrms.
To simplify the notation we anticipate that, given the risk neutrality of households, the price for ﬁnal goods sold
at date t, state zt is β
tqt (zt).
Problem of Firms type I.
There is a continuum of ﬁrms of type I in each island of type X by "buying" workers from a central location
at price λt (zt,Z). They start at period t =0with a proﬁle of workers given by their type X. Workers that are
"bought" in this period are given tenure j =0 . The operate the technology F. They can sale workers to the central
location they obtained a price θt (zt,X). If they "sale" workers with tenure J or higher in the island, they lose τ per
worker.
The sequence problem for the ﬁrms in the islands who “buys” workers at price λt and sell them at price θt. He
also pays the separation cost τ.
















































































































= Xj for j =1 ,2,...,J.
Problem for ﬁrms type II.
The sequence problem for the ﬁrms that produce home goods and reallocation of workers. They sell workers to
each islands, subject to the undirected search technology, and buy them back workers from islands. The ﬁrms also
operate the home production technology. "Purchases" are denoted by Sjt(zt,X) with price θt (zt,X) and "sales"
are denoted by Yt (zt,X) at the price λt (zt,X).
















































by choice of {Yt,S jt,U t}t≥0 subject to the undirected search technology, so that they cannot sell diﬀerent quantities






and the ﬂow constraint stating that workers "bought" can be allocated to either increase the stock producing at
home or to search:













































































xxviiAppendix E: Lagrangian for the Recursive Island Planning Problem.
It is helpful to rewrite the Recursive Island Planning Problem using the Lagrange ν and ξ for the constraints:

















[Tj − gj]+[ TJ − gJ]
⎞
⎠
+ν0 [U − g0]+
J−1 X
j=1
νj [Tj − gj]+νJ [TJ − gJ]
ξ [−gJ + TJ − s + h] }
It is immediate to obtain the following envelope conditions:
∂V (T,z)
∂TJ
= θ + νJ + ξ
for j =0 ,...,J − 1
∂V (T,z)
∂Tj
= θ + νj.
xxviiiAppendix F: Binding contracts and tenure at the ﬁrm level (a formal description)
There are competitive markets in the island. At each date t and event zt the set of commodities traded is S (zt).
A commodity s ∈ S(zt) is a stopping time indicating the time at which a worker will be dismissed under each possible
continuation sequence z∞



















for all ˆ z∞
t+1 such that : {zt+1,z t+2,...,zT} = {ˆ zt+1, ˆ zt+2,..., ˆ zT}.
When a worker arrives for the ﬁrst time to the island at date and event zt, he is a "newly arrived worker" and can
supply only one stopping time in the set S (zt). The worker cannot supply a new stopping time before the previous
stopping time is actually executed, i.e. before the worker is separated from his previous employer. The ﬁrst time
that the worker separates he becomes an "incumbent worker" for the rest of his stay in the island. An incumbent
worker at date and event zt can also supply any one stopping time in the set S(zt) as long as he has no outstanding
stopping time from a previous sale. "Newly arrived workers" and "incumbent workers" sell diﬀerent commodities,






for every possible realization z∞
t+1. On the contrary, the stopping time sold by a "newly arrived worker" at date and





, only if the realization z∞





≥ t + J .
Each stopping time, being a diﬀerent commodity, has a price associated with it. We express the price of the
stopping times traded at time and event zt in terms of the ﬁnal consumption good at that time and event, and
denote them for each s ∈ S (zt) by PA (zt,s) and PI (zt,s) for the "newly arrived" and "incumbent" stopping times,
respectively. Workers and ﬁrms take the prices PA (zt,s) and PI (zt,s) for all t ≥ 0,z t ∈ Zt, and s ∈ S (zt) as given.
The problem of an "incumbent" worker at time and event zt, if she has no outstanding stopping times at the


















where the expectation is taken with respect to all possible realizations z∞
t+1 = {zt+1,z t+2,...}, conditional on zt.
This equation states that an incumbent worker can choose to leave the island, obtaining θ, or sell the stopping time
s ∈ S (zt) that provides the highest value. A stopping time s ∈ S (zt) provides PI (zt,s) units of the consumption
good during the current period and the value I (zs) of being an incumbent worker at the (random) stopping time s.
Observe that, since the worker maximizes the present expected value of his earnings, equation (36) implicitly assumes
linear preferences.11


















This problem is analogous to the "incumbent" worker problem, except that the "newly arrived worker faces a diﬀerent
price for the stopping time that she sells and becomes an "incumbent" worker at the end of the stopping time (i.e.
she changes its type).
We let NA (zt,s) be the quantity of newly arrived workers hired with contract s ∈ S (zt) at time and event
zt. Likewise, we let NI (zt,s) be the quantities of incumbent workers hired with contract s ∈ S (zt) at time and
event zt.T h e ﬁrm chooses NA (zt,s) and NI (zt,s) for every zt and s ∈ S (zt) to maximize expected discounted
proﬁts, taking as given the prices PA (zt,s) and PI (zt,s) and the fact that the stopping times of the diﬀerent types
of workers entail potentially diﬀerent separation costs at termination. Without loss of generality, we assume that the
ﬁrm never employed any workers previous to t =0 . This will has no consequence in the analysis given our focus on
steady state equilibria.













































































































j in equations (37) and (38) denotes the partial history {zj,z j+1,...,zi−1,z i} embodied in zt.T h e ﬁrm
maximizes the expected discounted value of proﬁts, which are given by output minus the purchase of the stopping
times supplied both by "new arrival" and "incumbent" workers, minus separation costs. The employment of the
ﬁrm at time and event zt, is given by equation (37). This equation says that total employment is the sum of all
the workers, both "new arrivals" and "incumbents", that were hired between periods zero and t and that have been
never ﬁred along the history zt. Equation (38) describes the separation costs at time and event zt as the sum of two
terms. The ﬁrst term is the sum of all "incumbent" workers that have been hired between periods 0 and t−1,w h i c h
have been contracted to separate at date t if event zt took place. The second term is the sum of all "newly arrived"
workers that have been hired between periods 0 and t−J, which have been contracted to separate at date t if event
zt took place. Observe that those "newly arrived" workers that have been hired between periods t−J +1and t−1
and separate at date t and event zt are not included in equation (38) because they separate during the trial period
stipulated by the ﬁxed term contracts and, thus, are not subject to separation costs.






















The conditions for "incumbent" workers are similar. If NI (zt,s) > 0 at some time and event zt and some























where XI (zt) is the number of "incumbent" workers available for hire at the beginning of time and event zt,w h i c h










































Observe that the supply of stopping time is indivisible: Workers can supply only one stopping time s ∈ S(zt),
and only in the case that the worker has no previous stopping time outstanding. However, the linear preferences
assumed, together with the convex production possibility set of the ﬁrm, guarantee that the welfare theorems hold.






































xxxsubject to equations (37), (38), (39), (40) and (41).
A few remarks are in order. Clearly, the social planner will never want to separate a "newly arrived" worker
and rehire him as a an "incumbent" before the trial period for the ﬁxed term contracts is over. The reason is that
being rehired as "incumbent" makes the worker liable to separation costs, while maintaining his "newly arrived"
status saves on separation costs during the trial period. Also, the social planner will never want to separate a "newly
arrived" worker after the trial period is over and rehire him under an "incumbent" contract because this entails
incurring the separation cost τ without any beneﬁt. As a consequence, the planner will choose the stopping times
for "newly arrived" workers in such a way that they separate only when they are to leave the island (and receive the
value θ). This means that NI (zt,s)=0for every zt and every s ∈ S (zt).
Being left with only "newly arrived" workers, the planner’s problem is formally identical to the Island’s Planner
problem described in Section ??.12 This has an important implication: The competitive equilibrium with long term
contracts and tenure at the level of the ﬁrm described in this Appendix is equivalent to the competitive equilibrium
with spot labor contracts and tenure at the level of the island that was described in the main text of the paper.
Moreover, for every zt and s ∈ S(zt) such that NA (zt,s) > 0 the price PA (zt,s) must be equal to the expected
discounted value of the spot wages obtained (in the equilibrium with spot labor contracts and tenure at the island
level) by a worker that arrives to the island at time and event zt, and follows an employment plan described by the
stopping time s.
12In particular, it is identical to the problem of an Island’s Planner endowed with no worker of positive tenure at t =0 .
xxxiAppendix G: Calibration of τ.
Heckman and Pages-Serra (2000) propose to summarize employment protection policies into a single statistic.
The measure they use is the expected discounted cost at the time that a worker is hired of dismissing that worker in










t +( 1− a)Su
t
o
where T is the maximum tenure consider in the index, β at i m ed i s c o u n tf a c t o r ,δ i st h es u r v i v a lr a t e( p r o b . o f
remaining employed next period if employed during the current period), bt is wage earning during the advance notice
period for a worker of tenure t, S
j
t is the severance payment to a worker of tenure t if the dismissal is classiﬁed as
“justiﬁed” (i.e. “fair” or “objective”) and Su
t is the severance payment to a worker of tenure t if the dismissal is “not
justiﬁed”.
Heckman and Pages-Serra use a year as a time period, and the following values: β =0 .92 (an 8 percent interest
rate), δ =0 .88 (a turnover rate of 12 percent, based on data for the US), a value of T of 20 years, and for Spain they
advocate to use a =0 .2 for the period before 1997, based instead on the information on Bertola, Boeri and Cazes
(2000), "Employment protection, the case of Industrialized countries: the case for new indicators", International
Labor Review, 139(1):2000. Heckman and Pages-Serra compute their Job security index for Spain for the late 90s.
Since we calibrate our model to the period before the broadening applicability of temporary contracts, we recompute
their index for the policies in place before the 1984 reform. We use the following values:
- bt : one month of wages for tenure 1 and 2 and 3 months for higher tenure (from Chapter 2 of OECD Labor
Outlook, 1999, Table 2.2 )
- a :0 .2 (since their argument applies prior to 1984)
- S
j
t :2 /3 months per year up to a maximum of 12 months (from Chapter 2 of OECD Labor Outlook, 1999,
page 96)
- Su
t :1 1 /2 months per year up to a maximum of 42 months (from Chapter 2 of OECD Labor Outlook, 1999,
page 101).
We consider two cases. Case a: with these choices for bt,a, Su
t and S
j
t, and using the values for β and δ used by
Heckman and Pages-Serra, we obtain that I prior to 1984 equals to 0.42 as a fraction of annual average wages. Case
2, if instead we use β =0 .96, which is the value we use in our paper, and δ =0 .93, which is closer to the one for
Spain prior to 1984 according to Hopenhayn and Cabrales, we obtain a value of I prior to 1984 of 0.56 as a fraction
of annual wages.
Finally, since in our benchmark case the ﬁring taxes do not depend on the tenure of the workers, we select the
value of τ that so that the value of the index above will give the value we calibrate for Spain prior to the reform.

















The value of τ that corresponds to the ﬁrst case is 0.74, and to the second case is 0.98 of annul wages. We think
that for our purposes the choices of the second case better reﬂect the situation prior to 1984 and hence calibrate the
model to τ equivalent to one year of average wages.
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